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ABSTRACT 
One of the earliest steps in civil litigation is the “motion to dismiss.”  Dismissal offers the opportunity to 
preemptively dispose of a given claim that does not present a legally judiciable case or controversy prior to expending 
time or energy on matters like discovery or a trial.  Everyday talk, of course, is not bound by such procedural rules.  
Yet in normal conversations we often engage in a form of discursive dismissal.  When faced with discomforting 
claims our instinct is not to engage in reasoned deliberation over them.  Instead, we frequently brush them aside 
without considering their merits.  By delegitimizing the claim as entirely unworthy of substantive public 
deliberation, we need not reason over it.  Yet despite being a ubiquitous part of everyday conversation, this broader 
understanding of dismissal has not been independently identified or assessed.  
Focusing on the discursive form of dismissal yields important insights into how we analyze (or fail to analyze) 
difficult claims—something that occurs across all deliberative forums.  In this way, dismissal is not the sole or 
even primary province of the courts.  But courts do possess one characteristic that makes them worth assessing 
independently: they are a site where—some of the time—deliberators have to listen.  This places them on very 
different terrain than politicians, pundits, or everyday citizens, all of whom are relatively free to brush aside 
discomforting claims at their discretion.  Courts may play an important role in protecting unpopular groups not 
because judges are wiser, less prejudiced, or more insulated from democratic pressures, but simply because courts 
offer a space where—some of the time—arguments must be heard and reasons must be given.   
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INTRODUCTION 
In May 2004, Javad Iqbal filed suit against the United States government.  
His allegations were grave.  One of thousands of persons picked up for 
questioning after the September 11 terrorist attacks, Iqbal alleged that he was 
subjected to continuous abuse while detained awaiting trial, abuse that 
stemmed directly from his racial and religious background.  More 
importantly, Iqbal’s complaint did not attribute this treatment to a few 
overzealous low-level field agents.  He made a far more explosive allegation: 
that the decision to designate him and other Muslim detainees “high interest” 
was part of an official government policy approved at the highest levels of the 
American government.  Among the persons Iqbal claimed were involved in 
the decision were Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert 
Mueller. 
We never did find out whether Iqbal’s allegations were true.  The 
Supreme Court ultimately dismissed his case in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,1 a case that 
“revolutionized” pleading standards in federal court.2  Because the case was 
dismissed, it never proceeded to discovery, and so neither judges nor the 
public ever got the opportunity to examine or evaluate the record regarding 
treatment of Muslim prisoners in the aftermath of the attacks on September 
11, 2001.  It is possible that none of the misconduct Iqbal alleged occurred, 
and it is possible that if it did happen it was entirely unattributable to upper-
level governmental policy.  But the only fact we know is that we do not 
actually know one way or the other. 
Dismissal, put in an abstract form, is a mechanism for disposing of claims 
without going through a full and complete investigation.  And while 
formalized and codified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the act of 
dismissal can be seen in any deliberative forum where people attempt to 
register arguments.  Whether we are inside the courtroom or standing in the 
public square, we necessarily face choices about whether and how to respond 
to claims put before us.  Taken broadly, dismissal is one such response—or 
perhaps more aptly, non-response.  As a discursive practice, we dismiss a 
proffered claim when we decide to dispense with it prior to considering its 
merits. 
Whether in its legal or discursive form, the act of dismissal matters.  On 
the one hand, no deliberative forum can guarantee that every claim is heard 
 
 1 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 2 Kevin M. Clermont, Three Myths About Twombly-Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1337, 1337 
(2010).  Another case, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), is generally given 
revolutionary co-credit. 
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and every argument is considered.  There are limits to what even diligent 
deliberators can reasonably take up.  But at the same time, any functional 
system of social deliberation—from formal judicial processes to everyday 
discussion—presumes that participants will consider the merits of the case 
put before them and so, potentially, revise even passionately held beliefs.  Yet 
people are very adept at finding reasons not to engage in this consideration 
precisely because it runs the risk of forcing such a reassessment.  The 
arguments that most demand public engagement may well be the least likely 
to successfully get and keep our attention. 
The potential wrong associated with dismissal, in short, is not that 
deliberative resources are scarce.  It is that they are maldistributed.  Instead 
of substantively engaging difficult questions, threatening claims will be cast 
as inherently implausible, made in bad faith, or outside the bounds of 
civilized discussion—all potential reasons why one should not have to devote 
time and attention to actually considering them.  These claims are, in a word, 
dismissed. 
Understood in this way, dismissal is certainly not limited to the courts.  
Yet courts do provide an interesting comparative lens on the matter, because 
they possess one very unusual characteristic: they are a location where 
decision-makers frequently have to consider whatever claims come before them.  
While there are certainly many arguments courts cannot consider, there are 
also many circumstances where courts must consider arguments that the 
judges would rather ignore—they must grant a hearing, they must provide 
reasons.  This is markedly different from non-legal settings, where there is 
rarely anything compelling us to consider upsetting or discomforting 
allegations “on their merits”—even in a biased or motivated manner.  The 
comparative advantage of the judiciary—that it sometimes has to listen—offers 
a significant, yet often underappreciated, deliberative and epistemic virtue.  
Courts may play an important role in protecting unpopular groups not 
because judges are wiser, less prejudiced, or more insulated from democratic 
pressures, but simply because courts offer a space where—some of the time—
arguments must be heard. 
Part I of this Article outlines the concept of dismissal as both a legal and 
social practice.  As a legal principle, the dismissal sets out rules for when courts 
can (or must) not evaluate a claim put before them.  At the outset, this places 
courts in a unique deliberative position.  Other deliberators in the public 
square—whether they be legislators, newspaper editors, or simply everyday 
private citizens—face virtually no restrictions one way or the other regarding 
what arguments they must or must not consider.  Unlike judges, they are 
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generally free to consider any sort of argument they like.  Also, unlike judges, 
they are generally free to not engage with any argument they find distasteful.  
That judges—sometimes—are not just permitted but compelled to listen 
is a critical and underappreciated institutional niche occupied by the 
judiciary, not just compared to other political branches but over other modes 
of public deliberation.  If, as seems likely, the sorts of claims deliberators 
would rather not consider are asymmetrically distributed—most likely to 
emanate from marginalized, unpopular, or minority claimants—then the 
judiciary may be the only forum that will genuinely consider them if only 
because it is the only forum where someone might be compelled to consider 
them.  Yet if this is the unique deliberative virtue of the judiciary, then there 
is even more reason to worry about doctrinal trends (embodied in Iqbal) 
giving judges more discretion to dismiss cases.  These trends erode the 
judiciary’s comparative deliberative advantage and significantly impair the 
unique capacity courts possess to foster democratic conversations that might 
otherwise remain marginalized. 
When functioning properly, judges are more likely than other 
deliberative actors to have to consider uncomfortable or challenging 
claims—ones which strike at the heart of their political, cultural, or 
ideological priors.  But what in the abstract seems like a deliberative 
advantage for the judiciary also functions as a cognitive threat.  Hence, Part I 
explores the concept of dismissal as part of a trio of “cognitive checkpoints” 
we use to avoid discomforting or inhospitable conclusions.  The literature on 
motivated cognition has strongly challenged the naïve view the persons have 
an unmediated preference for ‘truth’ or generally appraise evidence in an 
unbiased fashion.  Rather, persons have preferences about the beliefs they 
hold, and seek to preserve these views against external challenge.  To this 
end they have several weapons in their arsenal.  Much of the motivated-
cognition research focuses on one particular method: how people make 
biased evaluations of evidence and arguments that challenge their desired 
worldview.  But this is only part of the story.  While this form of ‘evaluative’ 
motivated reasoning typically envisions a person who actually is grappling 
with the substance of an uncongenial argument (albeit in a biased fashion), 
often persons would prefer to sidestep that cognitively taxing process.  
People can also evade reckoning with uncomfortable arguments by 
remaining ignorant of them—that is, putting themselves in a position where 
they are unlikely to encounter the claims in the first place.  And even if they 
do come across a challenging claim, they can still dismiss it—they can use a 
variety of justifications to shunt the claim aside prior to engaging with it on 
its merits.  Evaluative motivated reasoning is in reality often the move of last 
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resort—it is employed when an actor has not succeeded in avoiding 
encountering the claim in the first place and has for one reason or another 
been forced to engage with it substantively.  
Dismissal can thus very effectively insulate cherished beliefs from 
reconsideration.  But, as Part II explores, it also often comes attached to 
unique and pernicious dignitary harms imposed upon the dismissed speaker.  
As a social practice, dismissal can be seen as an element of what Miranda 
Fricker calls “epistemic injustice”—wronging someone in their “capacity as 
a knower.”3  Fricker’s work, influential in philosophy but virtually unknown 
in law, concerns how we interact with one another as possessors and 
transmitters of knowledge.  An epistemic injustice denies or demeans this 
essential human capacity.  Dismissal very often represents such a 
degradation: it suggests that the claim—or claimant—is so implausible or 
insignificant that we need not spend any time considering it seriously.  
Part III offers the practice of dismissing discrimination as a keynote 
example of the concept.  In the social sphere, discrimination claims are often 
dismissed—“you’re playing the race card” is perhaps the most well-known 
iteration of the phenomenon—and this makes for a compelling illustration 
of the broader concept.  At its simplest, dismissing discrimination claims is 
justified by the presumption that such claims are routinely leveled in bad 
faith and therefore need not be taken seriously.  In more sophisticated guise, 
discrimination claims are dismissed as facially implausible by reference to 
deeply ingrained understandings regarding the meaning of discrimination 
and what facts we are willing to infer from the instances of conduct that 
typically prompt discrimination claims.  Even as it relies upon these 
understandings and inferences, the act of dismissing discrimination 
simultaneously insulates them from challenge since the decision to dismiss is 
by definition a decision to refrain from further engagement on the subject.  
Any inadequacies or shortcomings in dominant or personal understandings 
of discrimination can be ignored indefinitely, as the very process which would 
allow them to be revealed is short-circuited by the ability to dismiss the 
critique out of hand.  
Part IV concludes by reassessing the legal standing of dismissal as part of 
this wider discursive practice.  This approach is a comparative institutionalist 
one,4 although here the institutions to be compared are not just the other 
 
 3 Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing 20 (2007). 
 4 See Neil K. Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for Constitutional Analysis, 51 
U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 366 (1984) (urging that law pay attention to “the relative strengths and 
weaknesses” of the different branches of government in determining how to allocate decision-
making authority (emphasis added)). 
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branches of government but all social locations where we engage in public 
deliberation.  Many have been skeptical of the judiciary’s status as a 
deliberative forum because law can never represent more than a narrow 
subset of potential public claims of justice or injustice.5  Arguments and 
claims—however justified or important they may be—which do not cohere 
to an extant and cognizable legal claim cannot be recognized in court. 
This is all true.  But there is more to the story.  While legal claims are 
indeed limited, in the right circumstances they also can provide defined ways 
of pushing conversations forward.  Nobody can force the newspaper to 
publish your column, or a senator to meet with your interest group, or a 
congressional committee to hold a hearing on your bill.  But courts are 
different.  Law occupies a virtually unique deliberative niche in that certain 
claims must be heard—even if they are uncomfortable, even if the relevant 
decision-makers would rather ignore them.  And so, in considering why 
certain outgroups have often seemed attracted to litigation-centric strategies 
for social reform, the impetus may not be that judges are necessarily smarter, 
or kinder, or even more counter-majoritarian.  The attraction of courts might 
simply lie in the fact that law can provide a cognitive expressway, taking 
certain types of claims that everyday deliberators would prefer to shunt aside 
and ensuring that they get some form of consideration.  It does not do so 
perfectly, of course; and even when it does offer consideration, it provides no 
guarantee of victory.  But just being in the space of reasons can be a 
significant advance for groups or claims accustomed to being dismissed out 
of hand.  
I. DISMISSAL, IN AND OUT OF THE COURTS 
A.  Law as a Vector of Social Conversation 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) gives defendants in a civil action 
the opportunity to dismiss a filed claim.  There are several bases for doing so: 
the court might lack jurisdiction (personal or subject-matter), it might be the 
improper venue, or the claim might not “plausibly” be of the sort upon which 
the court can grant relief.6  The motion to dismiss, in turn, is a critical gate 
in the litigation process because it precedes discovery.7  Much of the hard, 
 
 5 See infra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
 6 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662 (establishing the “plausibility” requirement for 
pleadings); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544. 
 7 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (characterizing pleading rules as “unlock[ing] the doors of discovery”). 
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taxing, and expensive work of figuring out ‘what happened’ can be avoided 
if the court can decline to hear the case at its inception. 
But what is “dismissal” as a concept?  In its most abstract formulation, to 
dismiss an argument is to decline to consider it prior to substantive 
investigation.8  This is the function of the motion to dismiss inside the 
courtroom.  When a court dismisses a case due to lack of jurisdiction,9 or 
improper venue,10 or defects in the service of process,11 it is not issuing a 
judgment on the merits of the filed claim itself—it is explaining why it need 
not or cannot issue such a judgment.  Even dismissal for “failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted”12 does not necessarily render an 
ultimate decision on the substantive validity or invalidity of the claim—
rather, it represents a declaration that the claim is not of the sort that is within 
the judicial province to address.  
The question “dismissal” seeks to answer is whether and when a 
deliberator—in the judicial context, a court—must actually reason through 
a proffered complaint on its merits.  The motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) 
offers an opportunity to preemptively dispose of a filed claim prior to 
engaging in discovery.  At this stage in litigation the plaintiff has only 
provided a pleading which contains “a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”;13 the question is what a plaintiff 
must include in this pleading in order to survive the dismissal motion.  
Under this understanding, dismissal illuminates an important feature of 
the American judiciary.  By formalizing the circumstances where courts 
cannot hear or consider a claim that is presented before them, the concept 
 
 8 There are, of course, several notable differences between dismissal in civil procedure and ‘dismissal’ 
in private conversation.  For example, while a Rule 12 dismissal sometimes evades the merits of the 
dispute entirely (as in a standing or jurisdictional challenge), in other cases the only salient dispute 
is over the contours of the law and so a decision to dismiss may entail significant and searching 
consideration of the merits.  In other circumstances, where the implausibility is primarily factual 
rather than legal, courts avoid further inquiry via summary judgment under Rule 56.  See Makaeff 
v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 274 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (describing Rule 
12 and Rule 56 as an “integrated program” for determining whether to dispense with federal claims 
prior to a trial). 
  Of course, private deliberation does not distinguish between ‘law’ (or principle) and ‘fact’, so there 
is no analogue for the procedural differences between Rules 12 and 56.  And a dismissal on standing 
or jurisdiction is sometimes a closer analogue to my usage than is a 12(b)(6) dismissal.  These 
inconsistencies hopefully do not distract from the clear parallels between dismissal as a civil 
procedure concept and dismissal as a practice in non-legal discourse. 
 9 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1)–(2). 
 10 Id. 12(b)(3). 
 11 Id. 12(b)(4)–(5). 
 12 Id. 12(b)(6). 
 13 Id. 8(a)(2). 
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of dismissal also establishes that, if a claim does meet the criteria that make 
it into a justiciable case or controversy, then the parties are entitled to their 
day in court.14  A claim which survives a motion to dismiss is a claim which, 
at some level, must be heard.  This quality of the courts—their status as a 
place where decisionmakers have to listen—was recognized from America’s 
earliest days.  In Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville observed: 
It is the essence of judicial power . . . not to come of itself to the assistance of 
those who are oppressed, but to be constantly at the disposition of the most 
humble among them.  However weak one supposes him, he can always force the judge 
to listen to his complaint and to respond to it: that is due to the very constitution of 
judicial power.15 
And one hundred years later, Charles Hamilton Houston explained the 
NAACP’s litigation-centric strategy in pursuit of African-American civil 
rights in similar terms: “[W]e use the courts as a medium of public 
discussion,” he said, “since it is the one place where we can force America to 
listen.”16 
The judiciary is not always thought of in these terms.  There is ample 
reason to be skeptical of the ability of judges to provide any unique 
deliberative insight beyond what is already present in the broader 
population.17  Judges, after all, “come from society and thus are likely to 
harbor prejudices similar to those held in society at large (or at least society’s 
elite).”18  Consequently, it is far from clear why they should be expected to 
possess any particular deliberative advantage unmatched by other, non-
judicial actors.  For their part, judges insist on reminding the public that the 
role of the judiciary is not to “right every wrong, suture every societal wound, 
 
 14 See, e.g., New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 358 (1989) (“Our 
cases have long supported the proposition that federal courts lack the authority to abstain from the 
exercise of jurisdiction that has been conferred.”); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821) (“We 
have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which 
is not given.”). 
 15 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 668 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba 
Winthrop, eds. & trans., 2000) (1840) (emphasis added). 
 16 Mark V. Tushnet, The NAACP’s Legal Strategy Against Segregated Education, 1925–1950, at 18 
(1987). 
 17 See Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941, 949 (2011) (presenting these 
reasons, among others, for why many scholars believe that courts are “constrained” and litigation 
is an “empty promise” for social reform movements); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW 
HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008). 
 18 David Schraub, Unsuspecting, 96 B.U. L. REV. 361, 410 (2016); see also David Schraub, Comment, 
The Price of Victory: Political Triumphs and Judicial Protection in the Gay Rights Movement, 77 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1437, 1463 (2010) (“Where there is no social support for protecting a given minority, it is 
unclear why judges, who are part of that same society, should be expected to consistently rise above 
the prejudices of their times.”). 
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and correct every injustice.”19  And even where there is a valid role for the 
judiciary to play in addressing a given social problem, judges can nonetheless 
only select from a narrow range of possible interventions—large swaths of 
potentially productive or useful remedies remain outside of their purview.20 
Compared to the legislative branch (much less informal efforts at popular 
persuasion), the judiciary is by design a narrow and constrained body—one 
that can only redress claims through the very narrow prism afforded by 
established legal precedent.  Many claims—even very important, very 
justified claims—cannot be legitimately made in the argot of the law.  For 
this reason legal forums are often asserted to be “especially problematic” 
arenas for the deliberative project because of “the restrictions they impose 
upon admissible argument and so free dialogue.”21 
These arguments are not wrong.  But they are incomplete.  It is true that 
courts are in an important respect less ‘open’ to claims than are, say, 
newspapers or legislators.  Newspapers can publish whatever they want, 
there is no ‘jurisdictional’ bar that they need to account for first.  Likewise, 
legislators are largely free to focus their attention on any cause or interest 
group that strikes their fancy; they are not limited in their ability to conduct 
hearings in the same way that a court is.22  And of course, private 
conversation is open to any topic or debate that holds participants’ interests.  
But in another respect, courts possess an important advantage over other 
deliberative institutions.  Nobody can force the newspaper to publish your 
column, or a senator to meet with your interest group, or a congressional 
committee to hold a hearing on your bill.  The same freedom that allows 
them to listen to everything equally grants them the right to ignore anything.  
Indeed, this entitlement is central to the very idea of private deliberative 
freedom.  Jürgen Habermas observes:  
Private autonomy extends as far as the legal subject does not have to give 
others an account or give publicly acceptable reasons for her action plans.  
Legally granted liberties entitle one to drop out of communicative action, to 
refuse illocutionary obligations; they ground a privacy freed from the burden 
 
 19 Gerald E. Rosen, The Hard Part of Judging, 34 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 9 (2000). 
 20 See Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical 
Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1052–57 (1978) (discussing the limited ways 
in which courts can truly address racial inequality in America given law’s understanding of racial 
discrimination through the lens of discrete perpetrators). 
 21 John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations 71 (2000). 
 22 Cf. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 83–88 (C. B. Macpherson ed., 1980) 
(1690) (discussing the “prerogative” powers of government). 
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of reciprocally acknowledged and mutually expected communicative 
freedoms.23  
 
But judges are not free in this way.  As Chief Justice Marshall observed 
in Cohens v. Virginia: 
The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it 
approaches the confines of the constitution.  We cannot pass it by because it 
is doubtful.  With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be 
attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us.  We have no more 
right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that 
which is not given.  The one or the other would be treason to the 
constitution.  Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid, but we 
cannot avoid them.  All we can do is, to exercise our best judgment, and 
conscientiously to perform our duty.24 
Just as judges are limited in what they can hear, so too are they limited 
in what they can decline to hear.  The rules of judicial dismissal (indeed, the 
basic fact that, unlike its private or legislative counterparts, judicial dismissal 
is bound by rules at all) can act to force consideration of certain claims that 
would otherwise go unheard.  Law occupies a virtually unique deliberative 
niche in that certain claims must be heard—even if they are uncomfortable, 
even if the relevant decision-makers would rather ignore them. 
The mere fact that—sometimes—judges have to listen is a critical and 
underappreciated institutional advantage of the judiciary, not just over the 
other political branches but over other modes of deliberation.  An important 
part of political freedom is the ability to argue, before the relevant 
institutions, that one is being treated unfairly.  Even in a just society “bad 
things happen: people get assaulted, mugged, sacked without due reason and 
so on.  But what is crucial . . . is the victim’s ability to contest the wrongful 
treatment.”25  If the “relevant institutional body” (the police, the courts, the 
grievance committee, etc.) does not hear—or does not fairly and impartially 
 
 23 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to A Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy 120 (1996). 
 24 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821). 
 25 Miranda Fricker, Silence and Institutional Prejudice, in OUT FROM THE SHADOWS: ANALYTICAL 
FEMINIST CONTRIBUTIONS TO TRADITIONAL PHILOSOPHY 287, 301 (Sharon L. Crasnow & 
Anita M. Superson eds., 2012); see also PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM 
AND GOVERNMENT 186–87 (1997) (articulating the basic features of “contestation” as an essential 
attribute of republican freedom); Alon Harel & Tsvi Kahana, The Easy Core Case for Judicial Review, 
2 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 227, 238–39 (2010) (articulating the contours of the “right to a hearing” 
consisting of “the opportunity to voice a grievance, the opportunity to be provided with a 
justification for a decision that impinges (or may impinge) on one’s rights, and the duty to reconsider 
the initial decision giving rise to the grievance”). 
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consider—the complaint, then this essential element of political freedom is 
lacking.26  
When political or social deliberation functions properly, it offers a forum 
wherein people feel confident that the wrongs they experience will be 
carefully considered and reasonably redressed.  This does not mean that 
claimants must always have their claims ultimately vindicated, but it does 
mean that they will be taken under consideration.  To be sure, nobody can 
give full consideration to every potential claim or controversy.  Deliberative 
resources are scarce; triaging is inevitable.  But it is equally clear that these 
distributional decisions are fraught with danger.  When given the 
opportunity to choose, deliberators will predictably focus their attention on 
those claims and claimants least likely to disturb or unsettle their deep-felt 
social or ideological priors. 
Because courts offer a space where this discretion is constrained, they are 
uniquely advantaged vis-à-vis other deliberative institutions to offer a forum 
where even unpopular ideas or arguments can gain a hearing.27  Put another 
way, what makes the judiciary different from other deliberative bodies—and 
potentially more open to claims of socially marginalized groups—is not that 
judges are especially educated, empathic, or even sensible people.  Rather, it 
is that unlike the rest of us judges by and large do not have boundless 
discretion to refuse to hear claims that are facially disconcerting.  
To be clear, the deliberative advantage asserted here is comparative, not 
absolute.  Well before Iqbal, courts have had the capacity to dodge hearing 
cases they would rather not address on their merits.28  Yet it remains the case 
that courts possess an underappreciated, peculiarly democratic function in 
our governmental and social system.  Limited though it may be, the legal 
system still “provides a uniquely democratic . . . mechanism for individual 
 
 26 Fricker, supra note 25, at 301. 
 27 See Yuval Eylon & Alon Harel, The Right to Judicial Review, 92 VA. L. REV. 991, 999 (2006) 
(identifying the “right to a hearing” as the core justification for judicial review). 
 28 See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 42 (1961) 
(identifying judicial doctrines, such as standing, mootness, and jurisdiction, which assist in 
managing “the timing and limits of the judicial function”); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 374, 424–31 (1982) (noting the risks of the increasing “managerial” role judges have 
taken over the cases they hear).  
  A widely recognized recent case of this sort of behavior came in 2004, when the Supreme Court 
utilized the doctrine of “prudential standing” to overturn a 9th Circuit opinion striking down the 
inclusion of “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance without addressing the issue on its merits.  Elk 
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 17–18 (2004).  See generally Eileen Braman, 
Reasoning on the Threshold: Testing the Separability of Preferences in Legal Decision Making, 68 J. POL. 308 
(2006). 
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citizens to invoke public authority on their own and for their benefit.”29  The 
average citizen cannot get an audience with the President or a meeting with 
their senator; they are not guaranteed a voice in the pundit box or a space in 
the editorial section.  But every citizen has the right to walk into court and in 
some form receive an audience and response from an official representative 
of the United States government.  In a world where certain types of claims 
and certain types of claimants are routinely and preemptively dismissed 
without serious engagement, that has equalizing power. 
Unfortunately, a focus on the unique deliberative virtues of the judiciary 
also puts a worrisome gloss on recent judicial trends giving judges increased 
discretion to dismiss cases.  These trends erode the judiciary’s comparative 
deliberative advantage and significantly impair the unique potential courts 
possess to foster democratic conversations that might otherwise remain 
marginalized. 
B.  “Twiqbal” and the Problem of Plausibility Pleading 
For many years, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the rules 
surrounding dismissal buttressed this unique deliberative function.  In 1957, 
the Court in Conley v. Gibson stated that “a complaint should not be dismissed 
for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff 
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to 
relief.”30  This “no set of facts” standard was the legal rule for the next fifty 
years, and generally maximized the ability of litigants to gain a hearing by 
dramatically limiting judges’ discretion to preemptively declare a claim 
unsuitable for judicial resolution. 
Then, in the late 2000s, a pair of decisions—Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly31 
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal32—dramatically changed the terrain.  These cases 
tightened the pleading rules to require that plaintiffs set out allegations which 
“plausibly” support a legal violation.33  “Plausible,” the Court held, was less 
than “probable,” but nonetheless demands “more than a sheer possibility 
 
 29 Frances Kahn Zemans, Legal Mobilization: The Neglected Role of the Law in the Political System, 
77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 690, 692 (1983).  
 30 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). 
 31 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 32 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 33 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”) (quoting Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 570); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (“The need at the pleading stage for allegations plausibly 
suggesting (not merely consistent with) agreement reflects the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) 
that the ‘plain statement’ possess enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”). 
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that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”34  More specifically, the Court 
expressly held that simply asserting facts “consistent” with a legal violation 
would not suffice to establish a “plausible” case.35  This repudiation of the 
“no set of facts” test triggered a wave of commentary regarding the “Twiqbal” 
duo and its implications for civil pleading.36  One common complaint was 
that the cases created a Catch-22: Plaintiffs “cannot state a claim because 
they do not have access to documents or witnesses they believe exist; and 
they cannot get access to those documents or witnesses without stating a 
claim.”37  Others have protested that the process by which the Supreme 
Court altered the pleading rules was defective, leading to uncertainty and 
increased transactional costs.38 
One particular concern about Twiqbal, however, stands out: the claim 
that it allows judges to dispense with claims based on little more than whether 
they “ring true.”39  While the relative lack of discretion courts had over when 
to hear claims placed them in a markedly different deliberative position from 
other social actors, the plausibility-pleading standard injected significant 
subjectivity into the dismissal decision that was largely absent under the prior 
notice-pleading rule.40  In Iqbal, the Court conceded that “[d]etermining 
whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-
specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 
experience and common sense.”41  But judicial “common sense” regarding 
 
 34 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 
 35 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565–67. 
 36 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Iqbal and Bad Apples, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 217 (2010); Kevin M. 
Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821 (2010); 
Jonah B. Gelbach, Note, Locking the Doors to Discovery?: Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on 
Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270 (2012); see also David L. Noll, The Indeterminacy of Iqbal, 99 
GEO. L.J. 117, 120–21 (2010) (collecting and summarizing common reactions to the cases). 
 37 Rakesh N. Kilaru, Comment, The New Rule 12(b)(6): Twombly, Iqbal, and the Paradox of Pleading, 62 
STAN. L. REV. 905, 927 (2010). 
 38 See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 36, at 847 (“We regret the Court’s move [in Iqbal]— . . . not 
because we are certain that we lived under the ideal pleading regime, but because we are certain 
that a design change of this magnitude should occur only after a thorough airing of the choices.”). 
 39 Leading Cases, 123 HARV. L. REV. 153, 262 (2009) (quoting Adam Liptak, Case About 9/11 Could Lead 
to a Broad Shift on Civil Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2009, at A10). 
 40 See Victor D. Quintanilla, Critical Race Empiricism: A New Means to Measure Civil Procedure, 3 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 187, 201 (2013) (“[U]nlike notice pleading, plausibility pleading is a highly 
subjective and ambiguous standard, which may allow implicit bias to operate against minority-
group members.”). 
 41 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (citation omitted). 
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what inferences are reasonable or plausible does not necessarily represent the 
only conclusion that a rational citizen might arrive at.42  
Judges are vulnerable to the same biases as the rest of us; they are just as 
likely to prefer to not consider cases that carry a risk of leading to 
uncomfortable, disturbing, or otherwise distressing outcomes.  Several 
empirical projects have accordingly sought to quantify whether the new 
pleading requirements had measurably adverse effects on plaintiffs’ prospects 
for success.43  Discrimination claims, for example, have been particularly 
vulnerable to increased rates of dismissal under the Iqbal “plausibility” 
regime—and as will be argued below, it is not surprising that they would fare 
particularly poorly as judges are given more discretion to avoid discomforting 
thoughts.44 
Indeed, if the worry is that plausibility-pleading is a vector through which 
courts can dismiss claims that might prove especially unsettling or 
discomforting, it is quite possible (or should we say plausible?) that Iqbal itself 
is an example of the problem.  The allegations in Iqbal were explosive: Iqbal 
claimed that following the September 11th attacks he and thousands of 
Muslim men were targeted for arrest and harsh confinement conditions 
solely on the basis of religion, race, and national origin.45  These orders, the 
complaint alleged, came from top officials including Attorney General John 
Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller.46  The Court dismissed the case, 
concluding that the pleadings were insufficient with respect to these high-
level officials.  The Court conceded that the pleadings did allege conduct that 
was “consistent with petitioners’ purposefully designating detainees ‘of high 
interest’ because of their race, religion, or national origin,” which would have 
satisfied the Conley standard.47  “But,” the Court continued, “given more 
likely explanations, they do not plausibly establish this purpose.”48  These 
other explanations were that any disparate impact on Muslim men stemmed 
 
 42 See Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman, & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going To Believe? Scott 
v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 841 (2009) (finding that several 
significant subcommunities interpreted the facts of Scott v. Harris in a manner that the Supreme 
Court concluded would be unreasonable). 
 43 See, e.g., Gelbach, supra note 36, at 2276–77 (discussing multiple approaches to analyzing the effects 
of switching to the Twombly/Iqbal standard); Quintanilla, supra note 40, at 196 (citing studies 
showing that the new pleading standard has increased the dismissal rate for civil rights claims). 
 44 See Quintanilla, supra note 40, at 206 (“[F]ederal district courts have increased the dismissal rate for 
Black plaintiffs’ claims of race-based employment discrimination in ambiguous cases.”); infra Part 
III. 
 45 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 669. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 681. 
 48 Id. 
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from the Muslim background of the September 11th hijackers, and that 
harsh confinement conditions likewise stemmed not from their national 
origin or religion but rather their status as suspected terrorists.49 
The allegation in Iqbal—that in the wake of September 11 there was a 
widespread and official policy, dictated from the highest levels of 
government, to illegally target and indefinitely confine Muslim men in 
restrictive “supermax” conditions—is perhaps the paradigmatic example of 
a discomforting thought.  Persons willing to concede that “a few bad apples” 
may have engaged in illegal discrimination following the World Trade 
Center attacks may still nonetheless be uncomfortable with the possibility 
that this was official Justice Department policy.50  And of course, it is possible 
that investigation and discovery would confirm that there was no such policy 
and that any illegal conduct really was exceptional.  But of course, it is also 
possible that discovery would find the opposite.  The substantive result of 
Iqbal was that the judicial system managed to avoid finding out either way—
and thus guarantee it would never have to grapple with the implications if 
Iqbal’s claims were, in fact, borne out. 
That Iqbal has this effect is neither coincidental nor idiosyncratic.  It fits 
well inside models of motivated cognition, wherein people—judges included—
want to believe what they want to believe.  Normally, this proceeds via slanted 
interpretation of received evidence—the shading of ambiguous possibilities 
to match the conclusion one prefers.  As noted in the next section, however, 
a major point of vulnerability in this process is the possibility that one’s 
interlocutor really “has the goods” (or can uncover them in discovery) and 
can produce the smoking gun evidence that will force reassessment of deeply 
held beliefs.51  Rather than take that chance, the Court in Iqbal simply 
deemed it “implausible” under the circumstances, thus negating any risk it 
would have to reckon with contrary evidence. 
In other words, the very advantage of the judiciary identified above—
that it is often compelled to hear and assess evidence when other deliberative 
actors are not—also functions as a cognitive threat.  In practice, it means 
judges are more likely to encounter discomforting or challenging claims than 
 
 49 Id. at 682–83. 
 50 See Dorf, supra note 36, at 225 (explaining the Iqbal decision in terms of the Court believing that 
wrongful conduct, if any, was the product of a “few-bad-apples narrative” rather than systematic 
wrongdoing).  See generally Chiraag Bains, “A Few Bad Apples”: How the Narrative of Isolated Misconduct 
Distorts Civil Rights Doctrine, 93 IND. L.J. 29, 30 (2018) (arguing that “[t]he case law has developed 
the way it has . . . because of the dominance of a particular narrative about civil rights violations,” 
which some call the “‘Few Bad Apples’ story of civil rights violations”). 
 51 See Kunda, infra note 109 and accompanying text. 
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are other public deliberators.  The following section accordingly situates 
dismissal as part of a continuum of motivated cognition that acts to shield 
deliberators from thoughts they would rather not think and conclusions they 
would rather not draw. 
II.  THE CONTINUUM OF MOTIVATED COGNITION: THREE COGNITIVE 
CHECKPOINTS 
People have preferences about the beliefs that they hold.  That is to say, 
they do not simply want to know the unvarnished truth; they want to believe 
what they want to believe.  And by the same token, there are also invariably 
thoughts they would rather sweep under the rug.  “[W]e all have things we 
would rather avoid: things that are hard to hear, things that are difficult to 
accept or even to acknowledge.”52  Such beliefs are often uncomfortably 
dissonant with our core ideologies or self-conceptions, and so people try their 
best to remove them from our epistemic lives.53 
Motivated cognition, or motivated reasoning,54 describes the “less-than-
conscious tendency to reason toward one’s preferred result.”55  “Everyday 
experience confirms that people’s judgments are often biased by their beliefs, 
desires, and vested interests,”56 and legal scholarship has not ignored the 
problem.  Typically, however, it has analyzed motivated cognition through 
one particular mechanism: biased evaluation of ambiguous situations.  For 
example, a judge considering whether to exclude evidence from an arguably 
unlawful search may be influenced by the egregiousness of the underlying 
 
 52 José Medina, The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, 
and Resistant Imaginations 34 (2013). 
 53 James H. Kuklinski, Paul J. Quirk, Jennifer Jerit, David Schwieder & Robert F. Rich, Misinformation 
and the Currency of Democratic Citizenship, 62 J. POL. 790, 794 (2000) (“[I]nconsistency causes 
dissonance.  Because dissonance is uncomfortable, the individual seeks to avoid it.  Better, then, to 
make inferences that fit one’s existing beliefs and attitudes than not.”); see also Daniel T. Gilbert 
Elizabeth C. Pinel, Timothy D. Wilson, Stephen J. Blumberg, & Thalia P. Wheatley, Immune Neglect: 
A Source of Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 617, 619 (1998) 
(discussing our “psychological immune system” that fights against hostile information threatening 
to our sense of self); E. Tory Higgins, Self-Discrepancy: A Theory Relating Self and Affect, 94 PSYCHOL. 
REV. 319, 319 (1987) (“The notion that people who hold conflicting or incompatible beliefs are 
likely to experience discomfort has had a long history in psychology.”). 
 54 Technically speaking, one can refer to both directionally based and accuracy-based reasoning as 
“motivated cognition” (either one is motivated by direction or by accuracy).  See Ziva Kunda, The 
Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 480–81 (1990).  For purposes of this article, 
“motivated cognition” is considered to refer exclusively to the former. 
 55 Avani Mehta Sood, Cognitive Cleansing: Experimental Psychology and the Exclusionary Rule, 103 GEO. 
L.J. 1543, 1547 (2015). 
 56 David K. Sherman & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Accepting Threatening Information: Self-Affirmation and the 
Reduction of Defensive Biases, 11 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI.  119, 119 (2002). 
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crime; her desire to punish a particularly vicious act may slant her appraisal 
of the underlying legal issues.57  This will be termed “evaluative motivated 
reasoning.”  
But evaluative motivated reasoning is only part of a large continuum of 
motivated cognition.  Biased reasoning is only necessary if one needs to 
consider an argument in the first place.  If it can be dismissed out of hand—
or is never heard in the first place—then much taxing cognitive effort can be 
avoided altogether.  Hence, there are two prior “cognitive checkpoints” that 
also serve to ward off discomforting thoughts—what will be called 
“ignorance” and “dismissal.”  Precisely because these latter maneuvers elide 
the need to substantively reason at all, they can be far more effective—and 
far more dangerous—than their more commonly acknowledged cousin. 
Ignorance is, as one might expect, the state of simply not knowing the 
challenging information.  This can be purely coincidental, but it also 
encompasses acts or structures whereby persons are able to effectively shun 
sources of information which they predict will yield dissonance—for 
example, liberals refusing to watch Fox News while conservatives skip past 
MSNBC.  Yet even if one does end up hearing a claim, one often can still 
elect not to examine, investigate, or otherwise consider its details or 
particulars.  This is an act of dismissal—it parallels the civil procedure 
concept, which also acts to terminate (judicial) consideration of a given (legal) 
claim prior to the discovery process.  These three mechanisms—ignorance, 
dismissal, and evaluative moral reasoning—are part of a continuum58 of 
motivated cognition whereby we protect ourselves from adopting beliefs 
inconsistent with our priors.59 
 
 57 See Sood, supra note 55, at 1547 (finding experimental confirmation of this tendency); see also Jeffrey 
A. Segal, Avani Mehta Sood, & Benjamin Woodson, The “Murder Scene Exception”—Myth or Reality? 
Empirically Testing the Influence of Crime Severity in Federal Search-and-Seizure Cases, 105 VA. L. REV. 543, 
578 (2019) (finding “suppression determinations in real search-and-seizure cases suggests that 
federal Courts of Appeals judges generally appear significantly less likely to exclude challenged 
evidence in cases involving crimes that carry higher maximum penalties as compared to lower 
penalties”). 
 58 The description of motivated cognition as a continuum suggests that there are not sharp boundaries 
between ignorance, dismissal, and evaluative motivated reasoning.  Just how much awareness 
moves a listener from ignorance to dismissal, or how much consideration is necessary to convert 
dismissal into evaluative motivated reasoning, are matters of judgment.  That each may sometimes 
shade into the others does not significantly affect the concepts’ clarity. 
 59 In other words, all three processes—ignorance, dismissal, and evaluative motivated reasoning—
can be fit under the broader umbrella of motivated cognition.  There is potential for confusion, 
since in the literature “motivated reasoning” and “motivated cognition” are typically used 
interchangeably.  Avani Sood suggests that motivated cognition is the superior term because it 
encompasses “not only active reasoning,” (what this Article is terming evaluative motivated 
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To illustrate the difference between the three concepts, consider the 
following example.  Dana believes that racial discrimination in America, 
particularly by authority figures, is rare and getting rarer.  She is attached to 
this viewpoint due to various ideological and social bonds, and therefore does 
not like hearing about cases and circumstances which challenge her 
optimistic view regarding America’s racial state.  Josh is a person of color 
who claims to have been racially profiled by the police.  How might Dana 
successfully dissipate the threat Josh’s allegation poses to her worldview? 
The first answer is that Dana might remain ignorant about the allegation 
altogether.  Of course, there are all sorts of innocent reasons why Dana might 
never hear about Josh’s incident—but there are also ways in which she can 
stack the deliberative deck.60  For example, Dana might (consciously or not) 
think that persons of color are more likely to make discomforting allegations 
of racial prejudice and therefore be less likely to socialize with members of 
other racial groups so as to reduce the probability that she will encounter 
such a claim.  Beyond her set of personal acquaintances, Dana might tailor 
her media consumption to favor outlets which are less likely to devote 
attention to discrimination claims and thus are less likely to pass along Josh’s 
story.  If she successfully avoids hearing about the claim, she need not expend 
any additional effort rationalizing it. 
Suppose, though, that Dana does become aware of Josh’s claim.  Maybe 
a friend raises Josh’s complaint, or maybe his story happened to be picked 
up by the nightly news.  Even still, it is rarely if ever the case that all the 
details of a given situation emerge before the recipient of the information has 
time to react.  Though Dana now is aware of the basics of the issue—that 
Josh alleges he was the victim of profiling—she need not entertain it as a live 
possibility worthy of her time.  She can also dismiss it as unworthy of 
attention—“he is just playing the race card”—and thus justify refraining 
from delving into the details that would ultimately ratify whether the claim 
was a legitimate one or not. 
 
reasoning) “but also more immediate forms of acquiring knowledge and understanding, such as 
visual perception.”  Avani Mehta Sood, Motivated Cognition in Legal Judgments—An Analytic Review, 9 
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 307, 309 (2013).  One could simply call this final step in the continuum 
“motivated reasoning” and the broader phenomenon “motivated cognition.”  But this would be 
idiosyncratic, and so to avoid confusion the label “evaluative motivated reasoning” is used to 
distinguish it from other forms of motivated cognition which do not engage in explicit analysis of 
the proffered claim. 
 60 Consider James Baldwin’s searing indictment of the “innocence” of Whites in the face of ongoing 
racial injustice: “they have destroyed and are destroying hundreds of thousands of lives and do not 
know it and do not want to know it. . . . [I]t is not permissible that the authors of devastation should 
also be innocent.  It is the innocence which constitutes the crime.”  JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME 
5–6 (Modern Library ed., 1995) (emphasis added). 
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Despite her best efforts, however, there are circumstances where Dana 
might be effectively forced to take Josh’s claims seriously.  She might be Josh’s 
friend (in which case accusing him of “playing the race card” would be quite 
rude), she might encounter Josh’s case as part of the assigned reading in an 
academic seminar, or she might be a jury member in Josh’s civil suit.  In 
these cases, powerful norms exist which compel Dana to listen to the whole 
story and actually weigh the evidence presented.  And this is the stage where 
evaluative motivated reasoning comes into play.  If the case is ambiguous or 
the evidence unclear, Dana is likely to subtly interpret these ambiguities in 
ways which are consistent with her worldview.  Josh was exceeding the speed 
limit (even if by only ten miles per hour), and the police officer did say that 
his demeanor was suspicious given the time and neighborhood. 
Because legal theorists naturally are concerned with the success and 
failure of considered arguments, this last step—evaluative motivated 
reasoning—is often given outsized attention in the legal literature.  But it is 
actually best thought of as the final checkpoint on a cognitive continuum that 
also includes ignorance and dismissal.  Far from being the sine qua non of 
motivated cognition, it is often the move of last resort.  Exploring how 
ignorance and dismissal interact with their more familiar cousin provides a 
richer understanding of the psychological processes which enable us to 
protect deeply felt beliefs from external challenges. 
A.  Ignorance 
Evaluative motivated reasoning allows for people to rationalize around 
received information so that they do not threaten one’s cultural or ideological 
priors.  It relies on a biased appraisal of evidence—faced with a discussion 
about, say, gun control or global warming, persons will selectively read the 
arguments so as to fit within their preexisting beliefs.61  In other words, this 
form of reasoning kicks in at the point where one is already relatively deeply 
enmeshed in the merits of the dispute. 
 
 61 See Dan M. Kahan, Ellen Peters, Erica Dawson & Paul Slovic, Motivated Numeracy and Enlightened Self-
Government, 1 BEHAV. PUB. POL’Y 54, 69 (2017) (noting that individuals with higher numeracy will 
still reach conclusions congenial to their political outlooks, even when the data displays covariance); 
Dan M. Kahan, Maggie Wittlin, Ellen Peters, Paul Slovic, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Donald 
Braman & Gregory N. Mandel, The Tragedy of the Risk-Perception Commons: Culture Conflict, Rationality 
Conflict, and Climate Change 9 (Cultural Cognition Project, Working Paper No. 89), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1871503 [hereinafter Kahan et al., Risk-Perception Commons] (citing 
evidence that two separate political groups were equally likely to hold mistaken beliefs about 
“‘scientific consensus’ . . . on culturally charged risk issues such as . . . climate change, and gun 
control” (citation omitted)). 
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Hopefully, it is obvious why motivated reasoning of this sort does not 
account for anything close to the majority of scenarios where a given claim 
is not ratified by surrounding social actors.  The overwhelming majority of 
claims are not accepted as true not because they are evaluated and 
discounted in a biased (or non-biased) manner, but because they are never 
heard at all.  Most people, obviously, remain ignorant of most claims.  They 
do not read, hear, or otherwise encounter them, and so they never have any 
occasion to appraise them (whether dispassionately or not). 
On its own, this might not be worthy of too much concern.  There are 
limits to the amount of information anyone can reasonably be expected to 
process, and so the fact that most claims will not be appraised is true only in 
the trivial and banal sense that a great many claims will never be given 
attention.  This might be all that needs to be said on the subject were it the 
case that the distribution of heard and unheard claims was random.  But this 
is exceptionally unlikely to be true.  It is quite clear that people frequently 
structure their social worlds so that they are relatively unlikely to hear claims 
that they would rather not consider.  The most obvious and well-known form 
this practice comes in the form of media selection—liberals do not watch 
Fox, conservatives avoid MSNBC.62 
Hence, the first cognitive checkpoint that helps ward off thoughts we 
would rather not think is simply remaining ignorant about them in the first 
place.  “Ignorance,” Sharron Sullivan and Nancy Tuana observe, “often is 
thought of as a gap in knowledge, as an epistemic oversight that easily could 
be remedied once it has been noticed.  It can seem to be an accidental by-
product of the limited time and resources that human beings have to 
investigate and understand their world.”63  But ignorance can be quite 
conscious and volitional: we specifically construct our social spheres so as to 
minimize the situations where we come face-to-face with discomfiting claims.  
As José Medina puts it:  
Active ignorance is the kind of ignorance that is capable of protecting 
itself, with a whole battery of defense mechanisms (psychological and 
political) that can make individuals and groups insensitive to certain things, 
 
 62 See generally Americans Spending More Time Following the News, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 12, 2010), 
https://www.people-press.org/2010/09/12/americans-spending-more-time-following-the-news/ 
(providing analysis on cable news audiences in relation to demographics, including political 
ideology). 
 63 Shannon Sullivan & Nancy Tuana, Introduction to RACE AND EPISTEMOLOGIES OF IGNORANCE 1, 
1 (Shannon Sullivan & Nancy Tuana eds., 2007). 
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that is, numbed to certain phenomena and bodies of evidence and unable to 
learn in those domains.64  
The Fox/MSNBC divide provides stark demonstration that ignorance is 
more than just an acknowledgment of the inevitable limits of our attention 
and cognitive resources, and can instead represent an active attempt to 
distribute said resources to problems amenable to our ideological or cultural 
desires. 
Ignorance can also be an implicit or unconscious phenomenon.  Consider 
the concept of “aversive racism,” which plays a significant role in the related 
literature on implicit bias.65  Aversive racism generally refers to interplay 
between conscious egalitarian commitments and subconscious racial 
prejudice, resulting in the imposition of racial inequalities only when they 
can be justified by neutral rationales.66  But the “aversive” in “aversive 
racism” refers to a practice of avoidance—because persons feel the 
dissonance between their conscious desire for egalitarianism and their 
subconscious prejudice, they learn to associate interracial interaction with 
anxiety and discomfort and so become “averse” to and avoid such 
engagements.67  In this way, the anxiety often felt towards interracial 
interaction, and the ensuing self-segregation, can be seen as a form of 
(motivated) ignorance.68 
But ignorance need not be sought out—even subconsciously—to have 
normative significance.  It can also have a structural component that 
transcends anyone’s conscious or unconscious choice to avoid hearing 
certain types of assertions.  Even absent such a decision, the sorts of claims 
that are likely to emerge out of the infinite din of human experience and 
make it onto the broader social radar screen are not randomly distributed.  
This is true for at least two reasons.  First, the default package of socially 
salient issues that is immediately accessible without effort typically reflects 
that which is important to particular empowered classes.  “Ignorance” can 
 
 64 MEDINA, supra note 52, at 58.  
 65 See generally John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism, 36 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 (2004) (discussing aversive racism); John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, 
Aversive Racism and Selection Decisions: 1989 and 1999, 11 PSYCHOL. SCI. 315 (2000) [hereinafter 
Dovidio & Gaertner, Selection Decisions] (presenting a study of averse racism); Samuel L. Gaertner & 
John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 61 
(John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986). 
 66 Dovidio & Gaertner, Aversive Racism, supra note 65, at 7. 
 67 Gaertner & Dovidio, Aversive Form, supra note 65, at 36. 
 68 See Clarissa Rile Hayward, Responsibility and Ignorance: On Dismantling Structural Injustice, 79 J. POL. 396 
(2017) (discussing the importance of disruptive politics because it can create structural change and 
interrupt motivated ignorance); Charles W. Mills, White Ignorance, in EPISTEMOLOGIES OF 
IGNORANCE, supra note 63, at 13. 
August 2020] DELIBERATION AND DISMISSAL 1341 
in some cases simply reflect a lack of epistemic curiosity: people accept the 
default offerings and feel no desire to interrogate further.69  Moreover, “social 
stratification” often helps insulate the beneficiaries of unjust systems “from 
their effects; they experience all of the pleasure and see none of the pain.”70  
Residential segregation, narrowly focused media, and government 
responsiveness to the interests of certain social classes over others all 
contribute to an unequal distribution of claims which receive meaningful 
attention.  
Second, even where social actors are affirmatively-engaged listeners, it 
still might be the case that claims favored by particular groups will be less 
able to be rendered intelligible and therefore will not be expressed.  This is 
what Miranda Fricker refers to as a “hermeneutical injustice.”71  A 
hermeneutical injustice refers to the problem whereby “relations of unequal 
power can skew shared hermeneutical resources” such that the perspectives 
of the powerful are easily expressed through normal, well-understood social 
narratives, while the powerless find that their understanding of their own 
experiences is not quite as intelligible under these standard modes of 
communication.72  Sexual harassment, prior to the popularization of the 
term, is a paradigmatic example of a harm that was difficult to elucidate, 
even for women, not just because of overt biases but also because the relevant 
public knowledge for understanding it as a conceptually cohesive wrong had 
yet to have been developed.73  Prior to the 1970s or 1980s, men could remain 
ignorant of the problem of sexual harassment simply because there was not 
yet any widely accepted language available that would render a claim of 
“sexual harassment” intelligible. 
The practical effects of ignorance, in its systematic dimension, is to render 
certain types of opinions normal and others rare or aberrant—a person who 
very infrequently hears claims of racial profiling will find the exceptions to 
be, well, exceptional (even if the reason they are an exception is not their 
infrequency but rather that most of the other examples were unaired or 
 
 69 See MEDINA, supra note 52, at 33 (describing the epistemic vice resulting “from the privilege of not 
needing to know is a lack of curiosity about those areas of life or those social domains that one has 
learned to avoid or not to concern oneself with”). 
 70 David Schraub, Sticky Slopes, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1249, 1304 (2013); see also Robin DiAngelo, White 
Fragility, 3 INT’L J. CRITICAL PEDAGOGY 54, 58 (2011) (“Growing up in segregated environments[,] 
. . . white interests and perspectives are almost always central.  An inability to see or consider 
significance in the perspectives of people of color results.”). 
 71 FRICKER, supra note 3, at 147. 
 72 Id. at 148. 
 73 See id. at 149–51.  See generally Catherine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: 
A Case of Sex Discrimination (1979). 
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otherwise failed to register).  And in turn, the content of the ‘normal’ or 
‘typical’ opinions registered in a particular social context has an impact on 
what opinions are likely to be presented in the future.  People do not simply 
blurt out any thought or claim on their mind; they are far more likely to do 
so when they feel their arguments are in tune with the opinions of those 
around them, and are far more likely to keep silent when they do not.74  This 
reticence has a cascading effect: persons do not voice opinions they think are 
unpopular, further marginalizing their public salience and making it even 
less likely that such thoughts will gain airing in the future.75  The result is 
what Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann calls a “spiral of silence.”76  And the 
hermeneutical maldistribution identified by Fricker amplifies the effect: it 
limits the rhetorical resources available even for dissidents who are willing to 
buck the dominant trend.  In this way, patterns of ignorance are able to 
replicate and sustain themselves with considerable vigor and longevity. 
B.  Dismissal 
Another form of suppressing—or more accurately, evading—dissonance 
is through dismissal.  Dismissal is a species of motivated cognition in that it 
is a form of direction-oriented (rather than accuracy-oriented) reasoning.77  
But unlike evaluative motivated reasoning, which is a (biased) means for 
assessing the evidence of a proposition, dismissal occurs when one refuses to 
consider the claim at all. 
 
 74 Frances Bowen & Kate Blackmon, Spirals of Silence: The Dynamic Effects of Diversity on Organizational 
Voice, 40 J. MGMT. STUDS.  1393, 1396 (2003) (“People’s willingness to express their opinions is 
influenced not only by their own personal opinions, but also by their external environment, 
particularly what they perceive as the prevailing ‘climate of opinion’. [sic] When they are not sure 
that they agree with the majority, people are reluctant to express their opinions.”). 
 75 Id. (“When people perceive that they share the dominant opinion they will speak out, strengthening 
this position, whilst those who perceive that they hold the minority opinion will become more silent, 
diminishing their position.” (citation omitted)); Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability 
Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 685 (1999) (arguing that prevalent or expressed 
opinions have a tendency to “cascade”—they “trigger chains of individual responses that make 
these perceptions appear increasingly plausible through their rising availability in public 
discourse”). 
 76 Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, The Spiral of Silence: A Theory of Public Opinion, 24  J. COMM. 43, 44 (1974) 
(“The more individuals perceive these tendencies and adapt their views accordingly, the more the 
one faction appears to dominate and the other to be on the downgrade.  Thus, the tendency of the 
one to speak up and the other to be silent starts off a spiraling process which increasingly establishes 
one opinion as the prevailing one.”).  See generally ELISABETH NOELLE-NEUMANN, THE SPIRAL OF 
SILENCE: PUBLIC OPINION—OUR SOCIAL SKIN (1984). 
 77 See Kunda, supra note 54, at 480–81 (“The motivated reasoning phenomena . . . fall into two major 
categories: those in which the motive is to arrive at an accurate conclusion, whatever it may be, and 
those in which the motive is to arrive at a particular, directional conclusion.”). 
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In other work, I have sketched the basic concept of dismissal through the 
case of the “bad faith” response to charges of discrimination—for example, 
alleging that a discrimination claimant is just “playing the race card.”78  More 
detail on this example is provided below,79 but here it suffices to note that the 
key attribute of the bad faith response—what makes it a form of dismissal—is 
that it dispenses with the claim without having to engage with it on its merits.  
To say that someone is “playing the race card” is to say that their claim is 
fundamentally illicit—a ploy done for tactical advantage rather than an 
organic attempt to advance discussion—and therefore need not be taken 
seriously.80  This maneuver justifies refraining from engaging in reasoned 
deliberation over the discrimination claim, which in turn dissipates the risk 
that one might have to accept its validity. 
In many circumstances, dismissal can be thought of as a special case of 
what Miranda Fricker calls a “testimonial injustice.”  A testimonial injustice 
occurs where “prejudice on the hearer’s part causes him to give the speaker 
less credibility than he would otherwise have given.”81  Often times the 
decision to dismiss is indeed tied to assessments about the claimant’s 
reliability that are explicitly prejudicial.82  The rhetoric surrounding the 
“race card” claim, for example, frequently relies upon notions that 
marginalized persons are epistemically incredible—they lack objectivity or 
dispassionate neutrality compared to putatively unmarked majoritarian 
observers.83  Calling into question the capacity of marginalized persons to 
make credible claims in the public sphere is an easy means of dispensing with 
their arguments without having to engage with their substance. 
But like ignorance, dismissal can also result from structural factors that 
do not necessarily implicate even implicit personal biases.  For example, our 
prior beliefs about what is likely to be relevant or useful information in 
carrying inquiry forward may cause us to discount particular testimonial 
offerings—refusing to engage with them as part of an ongoing political or 
 
 78 See generally David Schraub, Playing with Cards: Discrimination Claims and the Charge of Bad 
Faith, 42 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 285 (2016). 
 79 See infra Part III. 
 80 Schraub, supra note 78, at 285. 
 81 FRICKER, supra note 3, at 4; see also Schraub, supra note 78, at 286. 
 82 Schraub, supra note 78, at 295–96. 
 83 See id.; DERRICK BELL, THE RULES OF RACIAL STANDING, IN FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE 
WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM, 109, 113 (1992) (noting that Black people speaking about 
racism will be viewed as “less effective witnesses than are whites . . . . reflect[ing] a widespread 
assumption that blacks, unlike whites, cannot be objective on racial issues”).  Bell also provides for 
an important exception: when members of marginalized groups criticize members of their own 
community, then their testimony will be accorded enhanced weight.  Id. at 114–15. 
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social debate.84  Return to Fricker’s concept of a “hermeneutical injustice,” 
whereby we lack the relevant language to understand a given claim as part 
of a generalizable or systematic experience recognized as wrong.85  Fricker 
focuses on the knower who cannot effectively articulate her own experience.  
But there is a related problem for the listener who fails to adequately perceive 
potentially valid claims due to an overly cramped and partial account of the 
relevant principles.  These are two sides of the same coin: the shared problem 
is that differing hermeneutical resources make certain types of claims 
(favored by certain types of persons) easy to process while rendering others 
opaque.86 
In the discrimination context, for example, the prevailing narrative of the 
concept might cast discrimination as something extreme (Nazi- or Klan-like) 
or rare.87  If this is how discrimination is understood, then a discrimination 
claim which lacks these characteristics (for example, complaining about 
microaggressions or paternalism) might feel discordant or ridiculous even by 
one who does not believe that the claimant’s class should generally have their 
credibility discounted.  Such listeners would justify brushing this sort of 
discrimination claim aside because it refers to something too minor, or to 
something that would implicate too many people, to be properly labeled 
“discrimination.”88 
It is hopefully clear how these two bases for dismissal—the testimonial 
and the hermeneutical—can end up reinforcing one another and further 
foster harmful attitudes and practices towards marginalized persons.  If 
marginalized persons regularly level claims which feel groundless because 
 
 84 Christopher Hookway, Some Varieties of Epistemic Injustice: Reflections on Fricker, 7 EPISTEME 151, 157–
58 (2010) (“There could be a form of injustice related to assertion and testimony that consisted, not 
in a silencing refusal to take the testimony to be true or expressing knowledge, but in a refusal to 
take seriously the ability of the agent to provide information that is relevant in the current context.”). 
 85 See FRICKER, supra note 3, at 147–51 and accompanying text. 
 86 See DRYZEK, supra note 21, at 70–71 (contending that political argument “involves communication 
in the terms set by the powerful, who almost by definition are those best able to articulate their 
arguments in terms of the dominative speech culture of a society”). 
 87 Taunya Lovell Banks, Exploring White Resistance to Racial Reconciliation in the United States, 55 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 903, 948 (2003) (“The dominant perception of a ‘racist’ is only the most extreme example—
a person who rabidly hates, often to the point of violence, persons from other racialized groups.”). 
 88 See, e.g., Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) (rejecting an early 
attempt to bring suit on a sexual harassment theory because “holding such activity to be actionable 
under Title VII would be a potential federal lawsuit every time any employee made amorous or 
sexually oriented advances toward another”); David Hirsh, Struggles Over the Boundaries of Legitimate 
Discourse: Antizionism, Bad-Faith Allegations and The Livingstone Formulation, in 5 GLOBAL ANTI-
SEMITISM: A CRISIS OF MODERNITY 89, 89 (Charles Asher Small ed., 2013) (recounting a 
conversation with a Dutch friend who asserted that “in the Netherlands one would not characterise 
[sic] [the play Seven Jewish Children] as anti-Semitic” because “[a]fter the Holocaust the word 
‘antisemitic’ was too strong”); see also infra Part IV.C.1. 
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they fall into a hermeneutical gap, it is easy to arrive at the mistaken belief 
that these persons simply lack a reasoned or “objective” view of the relevant 
facts or principles and can therefore be discounted.  Likewise, to the extent 
that marginalized persons are most likely to perceive a lacuna in the 
dominant understanding of important social norms, a testimonial injustice 
which preemptively discredits minority perspectives makes it more difficult 
for their observations to receive fair consideration or for their understandings 
to be incorporated in publicly intelligible conceptions of the relevant 
principles. 
Other scholars have recognized that people often act to pre-screen extant 
claims on criteria which have little to do with claim’s substantive merits.  In 
discussing their idea of a psychological “immune system,” Daniel Gilbert and 
his colleagues present a very simple example: the decision to “dismiss[,] as a 
rule[,] all remarks that begin with ‘[y]ou drooling imbecile.’”89  This 
dismissal is done as a substitution for actually engaging with the substantive 
merits of the remark (which, given the introduction, are likely to be hurtful 
or at least unsettling).  Eileen Braman has made the important contribution 
of connecting this phenomenon to legal behavior: her research found that 
decisions regarding “threshold” legal questions like standing were 
significantly influenced by study participants’ views of the underlying claim 
(at least in ambiguous cases with no controlling legal precedent).90  Even 
though standing decisions nominally are wholly apart from the substantive 
merits of a legal case, there is a greater propensity to dismiss cases on standing 
grounds when doing so will forestall having to consider a potentially hostile 
claim on its merits. 
Like all forms of motivated cognition, it is easy to think of dismissal in 
purely negative, even opportunistic terms.  So it is important to stress that, 
just as with ignorance, dismissal begins from a simple and important truth: 
there are many demands upon our cognitive facilities throughout the day, 
and we must prioritize what areas receive our attention.  “The quantity and 
variety of social stimulation available at any time is vastly greater than a 
person can process or even attend to.  Therefore, individuals are necessarily 
selective in what they notice, learn, remember, or infer in any situation.”91  
Gilbert’s ‘drooling imbecile’ example perhaps provides a fine case of a 
circumstance where dismissal may be perfectly appropriate.92 
 
 89 Gilbert et al., supra note 53, at 619. 
 90 Braman, supra note 28, at 315. 
 91 Hazel Markus, Self-Schemata and Processing Information about the Self, 35 J. PERSON. & SOC. PSYCH. 63, 
63 (1977). 
 92 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
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Yet it is evident why discursive dismissal carries significant potential for 
abuse.  Most obviously, what sorts of claims strike us as facially implausible 
will depend greatly on our past experiences, and hence social stratification 
can yield wide gaps in what sorts of statements seem reasonable versus 
farcical even amongst well-meaning deliberators.93  Persons who occupy 
epistemically privileged positions—who are unused to having their cognitive 
authority questioned or whose social appraisals are generally accorded 
respect—may be ill-equipped to critically reconsider their instincts in 
response to unfamiliar challenges.94  And when we reckon with the fact that 
people also have motivated reasons for preferring to grapple with certain 
sorts of claims while ignoring others, the problem intensifies further still.95  
Dismissal is motivationally useful because it obviates the need to consider 
arguments or evidence that might be brought to bear in favor of threatening 
claims.  Structuring our thought-processes such that claim-classes likely to be 
discomforting are coded as facially implausible or ludicrous allows for 
potentially dissonant claims to be headed off without having to do the hard 
cognitive work of actually reasoning around the merits of the case.  
Moreover, if we are refraining from considering a given claim solely 
because we need to triage scarce deliberative resources, then we have no 
grounds to speak to the potential validity of the claim.  We should, as Fricker 
observes, reserve judgment on its merit until such time as it can be given 
proper attention.96  The fact that dismissal so frequently comes attached to 
evaluative statements about the claimant (through terms like ‘bad faith,’ 
‘implausible,’ ‘playing the race card’ and so on), however, suggests that more 
is going on than dispassionate attempts at prioritization. 
And while anyone is capable of dismissal, it carries particular potency 
when conjoined with social power.  One of the more important attributes of 
power, after all, is that “you can opt not to listen.  And you do so with 
 
 93 See Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1106–17 (2008) (providing 
empirical evidence supporting significant gaps in how White and Black people, and men and 
women, perceive potential cases of discrimination); David R. Maines, Information Pools and Racialized 
Narrative Structures, 40 SOC. Q. 317, 317–26 (1999) (explaining that social stratification causes White 
and Black people to draw from different “pools” in terms of where they get background 
information). 
 94 See MEDINA, supra note 52, at 30 (discussing the problem of being “epistemically spoiled”); see also 
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 17 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978) (1859) (expressing disdain for 
“princes, or others who are accustomed to unlimited deference” because such persons are not 
habituated to considering challenging perspectives and therefore are effectively unable to 
acknowledge their own fallibility). 
 95 See Robinson, supra note 93, at 1124 (noting that “an individual’s social position shapes his 
willingness to pursue information about a particular topic.”). 
 96 FRICKER, supra note 3, at 172. 
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impunity.”97  Persons with power can often unilaterally set the conceptual 
boundaries of a given conversation, and thereby “preemptively silence” 
perspectives which might—if given due consideration—present an effective 
challenge.98  By contrast, a position of vulnerability makes it more likely “that 
one will need to attend to what others are likely to notice”99—while 
marginalized persons certainly can (under the right circumstances) argue 
against the principles or assertions of the dominant classes, they are rarely in 
a position to simply wave them aside outright.100  At the same time, persons 
holding epistemic power—who are in a privileged position to articulate what 
counts as valid knowledge and who are considered to be a valid exponents of 
potential claims—have every incentive to preserve their advantaged status.101  
Dismissing marginalized or alternative perspectives helps preserve this 
epistemic primacy. 
C.  (The Limits of) Evaluative Motivated Reasoning 
The structure and importance of evaluative motivated reasoning in legal 
decision-making has been analyzed in great detail elsewhere,102 so no more 
than a basic sketch will be given here.  Instead the focus is on how, despite 
the outsized attention paid to it in the legal literature, this particular form of 
motivated cognition is only a partial, and in some ways unideal, solution to 
the threat posed by a discomfiting allegation.  The purpose is not to discount 
evaluative motivated reasoning as an important phenomenon, but rather to 
situate it as one part of a broader continuum of cognitive practices. 
 
 97 Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law—A Conversation: The 1984 James McCormick 
Mitchell Lecture, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 11, 62 (1985). 
 98 Eric Reitan, Rape as an Essentially Contested Concept, 16 HYPATIA 43, 50 (2001) (“[I]f any one party 
has the power to unilaterally determine the conceptual framework that will be used in assessing a 
normative problem, that party will be able to preemptively silence certain dissenting voices.”). 
 99 Gaile Pohlhaus Jr., Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice: Toward a Theory of Willful 
Hermeneutical Ignorance, 27 HYPATIA 715, 721 (2012). 
 100 MEDINA, supra note 52, at 44 (noting that marginalized persons are often forced to understand and 
consider seriously the perspectives of dominant groups as a condition of social survival). 
 101 See infra Part IV.C.2 (noting the benefits of adopting “epistemically self-privileg[ing]” frames of 
knowledge). 
 102 See, e.g., Avani Mehta Sood & John M. Darley, The Plasticity of Harm in the Service of Criminalization 
Goals, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1313, 1345 (2012) (exploring “outcome-driven perceptions of harm in 
the context of the long-debated role of harm in criminal regulation”); Dan M. Kahan, Foreword: 
Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 
(2011) (arguing that constitutional decision-making is the “focus of status competition among groups 
whose members are unconsciously motivated to fit perceptions of the Court’s decisions to their 
values”); Sood, supra note 55 (discussing the exclusionary rule).  See generally Sood, supra note 59 
(reviewing the literature on motivated cognition in legal judgments). 
1348 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 22:5 
Evaluative motivated reasoning describes “the unconscious tendency of 
individuals to process information in a manner that suits some end or goal 
extrinsic to the formation of accurate beliefs.”103  It refers to how we process 
received information.  We see the protest, we listen to the witness.  In this, it 
differs significantly from both ignorance and dismissal.  In an ignorance 
scenario, of course, there is no received information to be processed—the 
listener is unaware that the relevant charge has been made.  And in a 
dismissal case, the listener has elected to refrain from receiving most of the 
relevant information—they are eliminating the allegation as a valid or 
worthy hypothesis prior to engaging with it on its merits. 
Focusing on the biased appraisal of received evidence, evaluative 
motivated reasoning understates how biases affect not just how we process 
information, but how we make initial decisions regarding what sort of 
information is worthy of our attention.  One recent study used visual-
attention trackers to see how people observed videos documenting physical 
altercations between members of an outgroup and the police.104  It found 
that persons devoted more of their visual attention to the party they were 
predisposed to see as the wrongdoer (so persons hostile to the police looked 
more at the police; those with negative attitudes towards the outgroup looked 
more at the civilian).105  Reacting to the study, which he labeled “the run-
away winner in the contest for ‘coolest study of the year,’” Dan Kahan wrote: 
Before reading this study, I would have assumed the effect of cultural 
cognition was generated in the process of recollection: that people were 
fitting bits and pieces of recalled images onto narrative templates featuring 
police force and the like[.] 
But [these] findings suggest the dynamic that generates opposing 
perceptions in these cases commences much earlier, before the subjects even 
take in the visual images.   
The identity-protective impressions people form originate in a kind of 
biased sampling: by training their attention on the actor who they have the 
greatest stake in identifying as the wrongdoer, people are . . . prospecting in 
that portion of the visual landscape most likely to contain veins of data that 
fit their preconceptions.106 
 
 103 Kahan, supra note 102, at 19. 
 104 See generally Yael Granot, Emily Balcetis, Kristin E. Schneider & Tom R. Tyler, Justice is Not 
Blind: Visual Attention Exaggerates Effects of Group Identification on Legal Punishment, 143 J. 
EXP. PSYCH. 2196 (2014). 
 105 Id. at 2205. 
 106 Dan Kahan, What “Bodycams” Can and Can’t Be Expected To Do. . . Plus Coolest Study of 
the Year, CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT (Dec. 25, 2014, 1:16 PM), http://www.culturalcogniti
on.net/blog/2014/12/25/what-bodycams-can-and-cant-be-expected-to-do-plus-coolest-st.html. 
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In other words, what made the study so fascinating was that it revealed 
just how early in the deliberative life-cycle motivational concerns came into 
play.  They did not only affect how people reasoned through received 
information, they also played a dramatic role in determining what sort of 
information people elected to focus on in the first place. 
To be sure, the assumption that persons have received and are analyzing 
(albeit in a biased manner) substantial information is a valid one in certain 
contexts.  A juror in a civil or criminal case feels obligated (one hopes) to pay 
close attention to the statements of a witness.  A student in a classroom feels 
obligated (one hopes) to consider the assigned readings carefully.  And it is 
likely that laboratory settings, where there are a variety of explicit means and 
implicit norms encouraging participants to pay close attention to whatever 
project they have been assigned, emphasize the salience of this particular 
mode of reasoning.  Laboratories, classrooms, and courtrooms are special 
cases where we have strong social and cultural pressure to pay attention to 
information.  If while serving on a jury a witness upsets us, we cannot simply 
change the channel.  For the most part, however, this is an exception and not 
the rule.  Nothing normally forces us to pay any attention to claims we would 
rather not consider. 
Meanwhile, evaluative motivated reasoning has several drawbacks that 
limit its usefulness as a means of avoiding discomfiting conclusions.  First, it 
is cognitively taxing.  It requires the subject to fully engage in the social 
question in order to construct a reasonable-seeming interpretation that 
coheres to their prior beliefs.  This “requires cognitive resources to carry 
through.”107  Motivated reasoning is in fact positively correlated with 
cognitive ability—persons with more cognitive resources are better able to 
rationalize towards the results they want.108  This makes it a risky proposition 
in situations where cognitive resources may be drained. 
Second, motivated cognition is not always reliable.  Evaluative motivated 
reasoning is not infinitely elastic; it only works if sufficient evidence exists to 
support a favorable outcome.  “[P]eople motivated to arrive at a particular 
 
 107 Neeru Paharia, Kathleen D. Vohs, & Rohit Deshpandé, Sweatshop Labor is Wrong Unless the Shoes are 
Cute: Cognition Can Both Help and Hurt Moral Motivated Reasoning, 121 ORG. BEHAV. & HUMAN DEC. 
PROCESSES 81, 87 (2013) (finding that persons “under cognitive load were less able to endorse the 
use of sweatshop labor than if they were not under cognitive load”). 
 108 See, e.g., Dries Trippas, Simon J. Handley & Michael F. Verde, Fluency and Belief Bias in Deductive 
Reasoning: New Indices for Old Effects, 5 FRONTIERS PSYCH. 631, at p.6 (2014) (finding that “higher 
cognitive ability . . . leads to increased motivated reasoning”); Kahan et al., Risk-Perception Commons, 
supra note 61, at 9 (finding that scientific literacy increases the divergence in opinions over 
controversial scientific questions because greater facility with technical reasoning enables persons 
to more easily construct desirable-yet-plausible conclusions). 
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conclusion attempt to be rational and to construct a justification of their 
desired conclusion that would persuade a dispassionate observer.  They draw 
the desired conclusion only if they can muster up the evidence necessary to 
support it.”109  But at the outset of a conversation, the existence of such 
ambiguous evidence cannot be guaranteed—sometimes one’s interlocutor 
really has the goods.  In that case, a person would still be left to reckon with 
the dissonance. 
Dismissal and ignorance circumvent these risks.  One need not expend 
effort reasoning around a given claim, nor incur any serious risk that it will 
prove impossible to credibly reject for non-motivated reasons, if it is never 
heard or dismissed out of hand.  For these reasons, it is likely that motivated 
cognition in its evaluative form is perhaps the barrier of last resort—it 
emerges in those relatively rare circumstances where we are forced to hear 
and substantively reckon with arguments that promote thoughts we would 
rather not think. 
III.  THE HARMS OF DISMISSAL 
While each of these three cognitive checkpoints interlock to ward off 
unamenable claims, the remainder of this Article primarily focuses on the 
particular problem of dismissal.  Practically speaking, dismissal impacts a 
wide range of potential social claims without an immediately obvious form 
of resolution.  The fix for ignorance is relatively straight-forward (if not 
always easy to implement): publicize the claim.  Beyond that, in general a 
person who has successfully remained ignorant of an unamenable claim will 
not be in an adjudicative position with respect to it.  In an informal context 
(for example, participation in public debate), the act of partaking in 
discussion about an issue presupposes that one has at least heard of it.  
Likewise in a formal context (e.g., a lawsuit or official complaint), by 
definition once that claim has been placed on the relevant docket the first 
checkpoint has been overcome—the respondent is on notice that there is a 
claim in play, and now must elect how to deal with it.110 
 
 109 Kunda, supra note 54, at 482–83. 
 110 This is, I admit, too simple.  A broad claim can make its way onto a judicial docket even as the 
adjudicators remain ignorant of certain localized knowledge or inferences important to the proper 
disposition of the case.  Depending on the particularities of the case, there may be no legally 
cognizable pathway for communicating this knowledge unto the judges and so they may maintain 
an effective “ignorance” regarding it even as they are forced, in some sense, to “consider” the case 
itself.  Cf. David Schraub, Torgerson’s Twilight: The Antidiscrimination Jurisprudence of Judge Diana E. 
Murphy, 103 MINN. L. REV. 65, 76–77 (2018).  But I cannot pursue that point further here. 
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The problems posed by evaluative motivated reasoning are not as easy to 
resolve, but they also do not cover large swaths of deliberative activity.  
Outside of a few specialized social contexts—a laboratory, a jury box, a 
classroom—nobody can force us to actually fully deliberate on topics we 
would rather dismiss.  In day-to-day life, much of the important action comes 
when we consider which claims are worthy of deliberative attention and 
which are not.  This determination necessarily occurs prior to having much 
of the substantive content that would ultimately decide whether the claim in 
question is true or false.  Indeed, one of the more dangerous attributes of 
dismissal is its peculiarly self-insulating character.111  Unlike motivated 
cognition, which can be overcome given sufficiently weighty evidence, 
dismissal operates a step earlier in the discursive process by refusing to admit 
certain classes of evidence at all.  Consequently, it largely lacks the 
boundaries of plausibility that rein in motivated cognition.  
Consider a case of dismissal which relies on the “poisoning the well” 
fallacy, whereby a person’s group membership makes them and their claims 
inherently untrustworthy.112  This rejoinder blocks the consideration of any 
assertion that could be made, “no matter how good it is, or how much it [is] 
based on good evidence.”113  “It is thus no wonder that so many prominent 
negative stereotypes key in on the supposed unreliability of the targeted 
group—devious and conspiring Jews, irrational and emotional women, 
simple and unsophisticated blacks.”114  
This illustrates a further problem associated with dismissal: it often comes 
attached to some particularly pernicious dignitary harms not shared by its 
two playmates.  Neither ignorance nor evaluative motivated reasoning makes 
explicit any negative attitudes about the person whose allegations are going 
unheeded.  But dismissal is different.  In order to reject a known claim prior 
to substantive evaluation, dismissal frequently requires explicit negative 
 
 111 Cf. Schraub, supra note 78, at 286 (“[P]rejudice yields the injustice, and simultaneously wards off 
complaints aimed at attacking the prejudice.”). 
 112 See Douglas N. Walton, Poisoning the Well, 20 ARGUMENTATION 273, 275 (2006) (describing, as the 
paradigmatic case of the fallacy, the claim by Charles Kingsley that “Cardinal Newman’s claims 
were not [to] be trusted because, as a . . . Catholic[,] . . . Newman’s first loyalty was not to the 
truth”). 
 113 Id. at 276. 
 114 Schraub, supra note 78, at 295–96 (citing Linda Martin Alcoff, On Judging Epistemic Credibility, in 
ENGENDERING RATIONALITIES 53, 61 n.32 (Nancy Tuana & Sandra Morgan eds., 2001) 
(“Peasants, slaves, women, children, Jews, and many other nonelites were said to be liars or simply 
incapable of distinguishing justified beliefs from falsehoods.  Women were too irrational, peasants 
too ignorant, children too immature, and Jews too cunning.”). 
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assertions regarding the claimant—that they are uncredible, untrustworthy, 
paranoid, or delusional.115  
This, of course, is a dignitary harm all on its own—it undermines a 
person’s status as a “knower,” the sort of person who can possess and transmit 
useful knowledge, which is an inherent wrong.116  But it comes attached to 
further secondary wrongs.  Dismissal necessarily impacts the “epistemic 
confidence” of the targeted group, whose instincts regarding their own 
experience are taken to be so transparently ludicrous that they need not even 
be given a hearing.117  “When you find yourself in a situation in which you 
seem to be the only one to feel the dissonance between received 
understanding and your own intimated sense of a given experience, it tends 
to knock your faith in your own ability to make sense of the world.”118  
Importantly, the rhetoric that supports dismissal typically goes beyond 
alleging that the target is simply “wrong or mistaken.”  Rather, it presents 
her as “being in no condition to judge whether she is wrong or mistaken.  
The accusations are about the target’s basic rational competence—her 
ability to get facts right, to deliberate, her basic evaluative competencies and 
ability to react appropriately: her independent standing as a deliberator and 
moral agent.”119  At the extreme, this message can be so internalized that the 
target entirely loses confidence that her felt experiences or instincts bear any 
correlation to an objective reality; and so she refrains from articulating them 
altogether.  At this stage, dismissal can loop back around into ignorance—if 
a targeted group does not believe that its thoughts (or particular categories of 
thoughts) are rational ones worthy of being aired in the public sphere, it is 
unlikely to present them at all in the first place. 
Indeed, dismissal is dangerous precisely because of how easily it can move 
“up the ladder” to exacerbate the problem of ignorance.  Earlier, this Article 
identified two mechanisms through which ignorance can self-replicate—that 
is, how the relative dearth of claims making a given assertion renders it less 
 
 115 See Schraub, supra note 78, at 295–96; Kate Abramson, Turning Up the Lights on Gaslighting, 28 PHIL. 
PERSP. 1, 5 (2014) (“[I]t’s important to consider the variety of ways . . . women are dismissed—e.g. 
‘too sensitive’, ‘paranoid’, ‘crazy’ ‘prude’ or the peculiarly existentialist dismissal of ‘bad faith’.”). 
 116 FRICKER, supra note 3, at 44. 
 117 Id. at 163. 
 118 Id. at 163; see also Noelle-Neumann, supra note 76, at 44 (contending that when a particular opinion 
seems to be rare, adherents will find themselves uncertain and may become reticent to express their 
views; “the more this appears to be so, the more uncertain he will become of himself, and the less 
he will be inclined to express his opinion”). 
 119 Abramson, supra note 115, at 8.  Abramson and Fricker both recount a passage in Simone de 
Beauvoir’s diary where, after a long-ranging discussion with Jean-Paul Sartre, she was left so 
dispirited in her reasoning that she said, “I’m no longer sure what I think, or even if I think at all.” 
Id. at 4; FRICKER, supra note 3, at 50. 
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likely that such claims will be aired in the future.  The first, associated with 
Fricker, is the idea of a hermeneutical injustice—the maldistribution of 
interpretative resources which make it harder for outgroups to describe their 
situations in recognizable and socially compelling ways.120  The second, 
elucidated by Noelle-Neumann, is the “spiral of silence” where people are 
more comfortable expressing common views and more reticent to express 
rare ones.121  Dismissal can feed into both mechanisms.  The rhetoric of 
dismissal tends to present the interpretive frames proffered by the claimant 
as illegitimate and the testimonial offerings of the claimant as irrational.  The 
former contributes to the hermeneutical gap by limiting the array of social 
presentations seen as valid; the latter promotes the spiral of silence by 
converting an unpopular opinion into a wholesale indictment of the speaker’s 
deliberative capacity. 
Dismissal thus has significant negative consequences with respect to its 
impact on the target.  But it also breaches a more general obligation that 
comes attached to our status as democratic deliberators: our duty to listen.  
Democratic citizenship does not require universal agreement on contested 
issues.  But it does require that we commit to giving each other’s claims a fair 
hearing and due consideration.122  Public conversation and debate is the 
primary arena we have for engaging in such consideration.  Unlike “the 
privacy and anonymity of the ballot box,” where “we have no chance to 
review our own judgments against what others have to say,” the purpose of 
public argument is precisely to at least provide the opportunity to “revise and 
reconsider our positions.”123  Dismissal—the decision to decline to listen—
circumvents that process. 
It is important to note that dismissal is a problem that stands separate 
from whether the underlying claim ultimately has merit.  Of course, dismissal 
entails declining to substantively address an extant claim, and that implies 
that certain claims that should be ratified will instead be ignored.  But even 
if a given claim should—after due consideration—be rejected, it would still 
be problematic if the claimant was in fact never given the opportunity to 
 
 120 See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text. 
 121 See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text. 
 122 Brandon Morgan-Olsen, A Duty to Listen: Epistemic Obligations and Public Deliberation, 39 SOC. THEORY 
& PRAC. 185, 188 (2013) (“There is no conduit from a citizen’s lips to the exercise of political power 
save the ears of others, and to fail to listen fair-mindedly in the public square can thereby represent 
a failure to acknowledge another’s status as citizen.”); see also IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION 
AND DEMOCRACY 24 (2000) (arguing that rational political discussion requires that participants 
enter into the conversation with the goal—not guarantee—of agreement). 
 123 ANNE PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF PRESENCE 150 (1995); see also Fred O. Smith, Jr., Due Process, 
Republicanism, and Direct Democracy, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 582, 611–13 (2014). 
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receive such consideration.124  Much of the public outrage over the Trayvon 
Martin killing, for example, arose not only because of the actual death of a 
young Black teenager but because the police initially did not arrest his 
shooter, instead seeming to instantly credit George Zimmerman’s claim of 
self-defense.125  Even if one thinks that the evidence that was ultimately 
produced was insufficient to prove Zimmerman guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the initial failure to seriously investigate it as a potential homicide—
to effectively dismiss the possibility that it was a murder—is hard to square 
with any commitment to epistemic equality and is a wrong in and of itself.  
On that front, it is noteworthy how many of the most significant Black Lives 
Matter protests commenced because of the perception that authorities were 
not even initiating a serious investigation into racist violence against Black 
men and women. Ahmaud Arbery's case surged to public prominence when 
a local prosecutor declined to recommend charges against his killers, 
concluding that the shooters had attempted a "perfectly legal" citizen's arrest 
of Arbery as a burglary suspect.126  As this article went to press, citizens and 
activists continued to demand justice for Breonna Taylor, emphasizing that 
no officer had yet been charged months after Taylor was killed during a 
nighttime "no-knock" raid at her house.127  A significant motivator of the 
“Black Lives Matter” movement, it seems, is not just about the specific 
outcomes of individual cases but also a more general sense that allegations of 
violence against Black persons are systematically dismissed as valid 
candidates for investigation.128 
The confidence that one’s contributions to the debate were given due 
consideration, even if the outcome is unfavorable, matters.  Tom Tyler’s 
work on “procedural justice” amasses powerful evidence that people place 
 
 124 See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 666 (1978) (“Both the right to be heard 
from, and the right to be told why, are analytically distinct from the right to secure a different 
outcome . . . .”); Harel & Kahana, supra note 25, at 238–39 (articulating the right of a judicial 
hearing that is “valued independently of the merit of the decision likely to be generated at the end 
of this process”). 
 125 See, e.g., Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Post-Racial Society, 
91 N.C. L. REV. 1555, 1558 (2013) (noting that “[t]he failure of the Sanford police department to 
arrest Zimmerman” after he asserted he acted in self-defense “created a firestorm of protests”). 
126  See Erik Ortiz, Were Pursuit and Killing of Ahmaud Arbery 'Perfectly Legal'? It's Not That Simple, NBC 
NEWS (May 13, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/was-pursuit-killing-ahmaud-
arbery-perfectly-legal-it-s-not-n1205581. 
127  Josh Wood, Breonna Taylor Killing: Call for Justice Intensifies after Months of Frustration, GUARDIAN (July 
26, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jul/26/breonna-taylor-killing-justice-
louisville-kentucky. 
 128 See David Schraub & Joel Sati, Epistemic Injustice in Collecting and Appraising Evidence, in THE 
ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO EVIDENCE (Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn eds.) 
(forthcoming 2021). 
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considerable independent weight on the knowledge that their voices were 
heard, even where they know they did not affect the ultimate conclusion.129  
It follows that people will experience an injustice when their attempts to enter 
into social conversation are systematically rebuffed; and they do not conflate 
this treatment with considered disagreement regarding the merits of their 
position even though the tangible outcomes might be identical.  There is, in 
other words, a significant and morally salient distinction between rejecting a 
claim because after serious consideration we conclude it is untenable, and 
rejecting a claim because we conclude the person bringing it simply is not 
worthy of our attention (even if the underlying facts of the claim are the 
same).130  Dismissal implicates the latter set of concerns; the problem of 
dismissal is not that of ill-formed or even biased appraisal of the merits of a 
given controversy, but the failure to even acknowledge the controversy as a 
legitimate entrant into public conversation. 
The ideal theory response to dismissal might seem to be a demand that 
all claims in all contexts be given full, fair, and charitable review.  
Unfortunately, we do not live in an ideal world, and in particular we lack the 
surfeit of deliberative resources that would allow us to give every single 
proffered claim this sort of full hearing.131  What are our deliberative 
obligations given these limitations?  
Most obviously, those claims that are left aside due to the inability to 
devote proper attention to them still cannot be justly rejected.  We can only 
(and should only) reserve judgment on them until such time as they are able 
to be given their due consideration.132  This may mean that judgment on 
certain claims are deferred more-or-less indefinitely; this is an injustice, but 
a lesser one (and a more unavoidable one) than outright rejecting them 
without providing reasoned argument. 
 
 129 See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 149 (2006) (finding that people do not need 
to know that their contribution affected the outcome for them to consider the outcome legitimate, 
but they do need to know that their contribution was considered). 
 130 Cf. David Hirsh, Accusations of Malicious Intent in Debates about the Palestine-Israel Conflict and 
about Anti-Semitism: The Livingstone Formulation, ‘Playing the Antisemitism Card’ and 
Contesting the Boundaries of Antiracist Discourse, 1 TRANSVERSAL 47, 47–48 (2010) 
(distinguishing between “those who are accused of employing antisemitic discourse and who 
respond in a measured and rational way to such accusations in a good faith effort to relate to the 
concern, and to refute it” and those who refuse outright “to engage with the issue of antisemitism”). 
 131 See Mark E. Warren, Deliberative Democracy and Authority, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 46, 57–58 (1996) 
(noting that there will always be limits on the amount of time and attention persons can devote to 
particular issues); MEDINA, supra note 52, at 33 (“[O]nly a superhuman knower could be always 
ready to embark on every possible discovery journey that comes her way.”). 
 132 See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
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More concretely, recognizing the particular biases in dismissal suggests 
that we should expend considerable effort in ensuring that the claims that we 
do consider come from a diverse and representative cross-sample of the 
community.  Recall that the wrong of both dismissal and ignorance is less the 
inescapable fact that not every claim will be considered and more the 
maldistribution of deliberative expenditures to favor the sorts of claims which 
are amenable to dominant social groups.133  Consequently, political 
deliberation should take special attention towards ensuring that marginalized 
perspectives are given opportunity to voice their claims.134  As Fricker 
observes, the key virtue that needs to be brought to bear to correct 
testimonial injustices is the possession of “reflexive critical awareness of the 
likely presence of prejudice.”135  We should, in other words, be especially 
alert in circumstances where it seems more likely that prejudice, implicit bias, 
hermeneutical gaps, or other like malfunctions are in play and are the tail 
wagging the dismissal dog.  Deliberative scarcity can justify not considering 
every claim in the aggregate, but it cannot justify the motivational slant that 
makes dismissal so dangerous—and dismissing discrimination so appealing. 
IV.  DISMISSING DISCRIMINATION 
Dismissal is a pervasive phenomenon.  It is a temptation that exists any 
time one has a strong preference in favor of maintaining a given belief and 
there are low costs to refusing to consider alternatives.  This Part focuses on 
the dismissal of discrimination claims as a particularly illustrative example.  
Its target is not exclusively legal discrimination claims, though it is notable 
that such claims fare notoriously poorly in the courts,136 and it suggests that 
“dismissal” can explain some judicial reticence around expanding legal 
 
 133 See supra notes 61–62, 91 and accompanying text. 
 134 See YOUNG, supra note 122, at 136–46.  Young’s analysis of the concept of “perspective”—which 
focuses on the fact that people are “differently positioned” and therefore “have different experience, 
history, and social knowledge derived from that positioning,” is informative.  Id. at 136.  Particularly 
relevant is her observation that perspective places the focus on what helps create the set of questions 
and assumptions from which we begin to reason, rather than the specific content that we ultimately 
arrive at once the deliberative process concludes.  Id. at 137–39. 
 135 FRICKER, supra note 3, at 91 (“When the hearer suspects prejudice in her credibility judgment . . . 
she should shift intellectual gear out of spontaneous, unreflective mode and into active critical 
reflection in order to identify how far the suspected prejudice has influenced her judgment.”). 
 136 See, e.g., SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMERICA’S COURTS 
UNDERMINE DISCRIMINATION LAW (2017); Quintanilla, supra note 40; Victor D. Quintanilla, 
Beyond Common Sense: A Social-Psychological Study of Iqbal’s Effect on Claims of Race Discrimination, 17 
MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (2011); Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard To 
Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555 (2001). 
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discrimination protections.137  But the legal treatment of discrimination is 
situated within a broader deliberative ecosystem that also attends to how we 
respond to such claims socially and politically—rhetorical maneuvers and 
political justifications standing alongside formalized doctrine.138 
Discrimination is an evocative case of discursive dismissal for several 
reasons.  To begin, the psychological literature exploring how people 
maintain prejudiced belief structures is particularly robust and easy to 
grapple with.  More importantly, discrimination claims provide a familiar 
example of dismissal in practice: charging claimants with “playing the race 
card.”  The “race card” response (or its equivalents as applied to other forms 
of discrimination) is a means of declaring that the discrimination claim has 
been leveled in bad faith; hence, the discussion need not proceed any further.  
In this way, allegations of racism, sexism, antisemitism, and the like are 
routinely brushed aside as implausible on their face. 
After providing a brief sketch of the familiar “race card” response as an 
example of dismissal, this Part provides an account of its utility under an 
aversive racism model.  It then explains how persons construct the meaning 
of “discrimination” in ways which normalize its dismissal, even as they 
purport to affirm the serious moral wrongfulness of engaging in identity-
based prejudice.  Two mechanisms—heightening the “seriousness” of a 
discrimination charge in order to reduce its scope, and hinging a valid finding 
of discrimination on the existence of conscious, volitional discriminatory 
intent—are well-entrenched in legal and social argument and do much to 
facilitate dismissing discrimination in both domains. 
A.  “The Race Card” and Other Methods of Dismissing Discrimination 
A common, even ubiquitous, response to claims of discrimination is to 
assert that they have been leveled in bad faith.  In the context of race relations 
this challenge usually means accusing the claimant of “playing the race 
card”; that is, alleging that they brought up the prospect of racial 
discrimination not because of “a credible (or perhaps even sincere) belief that 
unfair or unequal treatment has occurred,” but rather merely as a ploy to 
illicitly gain public sympathy or private reward.139  Constructed in this way, 
the racism charge can be reasonably dismissed—one need not spend time 
grappling with an obviously incredible or dishonest argument.  Recognizing 
 
 137 See infra notes 193–214. 
 138 See BELL, supra note 83, at 111 (using the metaphor of legal standing to attack the practice “in the 
world generally” of declining to accord legitimacy to Black perspectives regarding race). 
 139 See Schraub, supra note 78, at 285. 
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this problem, scholars have sought to present evidence of discrimination  
in ways that they think will evade the “race card” riposte and  
demand substantive engagement.140  These efforts have generally been 
unsuccessful.141 
As David Wilkins observes, the “race card” objection is a pervasive retort 
that can be used to dismiss virtually any racially inflected topic of 
conversation.142  For example, conservative critics rapidly deployed this trope 
against President Barack Obama and Attorney General Eric Holder for even 
relatively mild acknowledgements of the intersection between race and police 
violence.  Holder’s statement that “I understand that mistrust” that many 
people of color harbor towards the police,143 and his affirmation that 
“President Obama is keenly interested in how majority white police 
departments in communities like Ferguson treat black youths,” led to the 
furious headline “Obama Administration Plays Race Card in Ferguson.”144  
Rep. Steve King, a Republican from Iowa, said that Ferguson was being 
beset upon by “race hustlers” seeking to “monetize” the tragedy.  Among 
this group he included the President, the Attorney General, St. Louis-area 
Representative William Lacy Clay, and the Congressional Black Caucus.  
With respect to the latter, King contended that “they’re always looking to 
place the race card.  They’re always looking to divide people down that line.  
 
 140 See Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action”, 
94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1117 (2006) (“Unwarranted discrimination exists here and now: it can be 
documented through scientific methods that cannot be dismissed as hyperbole or playing the ‘race 
card.’”); Rachel Lyon, Media, Race, Crime, and Punishment: Re-Framing Stereotypes In Crime and Human 
Rights Issues, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 741, 758 (2009) (“With an African American in the White House, 
the ‘issue’ of having a skewed, racialized justice system is more likely to be addressed, or at least not 
dismissed as ‘the race card.’”). 
 141 See Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 
279, 341 (1997) (“Experience has shown that preconceptions about discrimination are remarkably 
resilient to empirical proof.”); Camille A. Nelson, Racial Paradox and Eclipse: Obama as a Balm for What 
Ails Us, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 743, 769 (2009) (quoting Geraldine Ferraro as complaining that 
“Obama’s playing the race card throughout the campaign and no one [is] calling him for it”). 
 142 David B. Wilkins, The New Social Engineers in the Age of Obama: Black Corporate Lawyers and the Making of 
the First Black President, 53 HOW. L.J. 557, 636 (2010) (observing that “any attempt to discuss race—
no matter how justified or accurate—is too often dismissed as ‘playing the race card’”). 
 143 See Arit John, Eric Holder Almost Gives the Ferguson Race Speech Obama Couldn’t, YAHOO! News 
(Aug. 20, 2014), http://news.yahoo.com/eric-holder-almost-gives-ferguson-race-speech-obama-2
15409787.html. 
 144 Obama Administration Plays Race Card in Ferguson, JUDICIAL WATCH (Aug. 22, 2014), 
http://www.judicialwatch.org/press-room/weekly-updates/obama-administration-plays-race-car
d-ferguson/. 
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And I have friends in that caucus.  I get along with them personally, but their 
agenda is to play the race card.”145 
Absent from these contentions is any substantive reply to specific 
allegations of racial injustice.  They instead fulminate generally against the 
facial illegitimacy of raising the issue at all, divorced entirely from the merits 
or infirmities of particular claims or circumstances.  Perhaps the apex of this 
trope, then, was a 2009 column in which Peter Wehner preemptively 
announced that, if President Obama’s poll numbers were to drop, “be 
prepared for the ‘race card’ to be played.”  And not only was Wehner sure 
that racism charges would be made, he also could pass advance judgment on 
their veracity: “the charges will be . . . transparently false.”146  Here was a 
particularly naked articulation of the general practice: it is not specific 
complaints of racism that are wrong (for specific reasons); all complaints of 
racism, even those not yet made, can be assumed to be wrong because their 
core characteristic is that they are deployed in bad faith. 
While the “race card” trope is the most rhetorically familiar, similar 
refrains can be easily found applied against other discrimination charges.  
The video game industry, for example, was rocked by charges of endemic 
sexism embodied by the experiences of critic Anita Sarkeesian.  Sarkeesian, 
whose web series ‘Tropes vs. Women in Video Games’ explored sexist 
elements in prominent products, was subjected to a vicious series of attacks, 
bomb threats, promises of rape, and a video game titled “Beat Up Anita 
Sarkeesian.”147  Even still, some industry members held that Sarkeesian was 
being dishonest in using the “trump card” of sexism.148  “Sexism,” columnist 
 
 145 Tom Kludt, Steve King Goes Off About Ferguson and the Congressional Black Caucus, TALKING POINTS 
MEMO (Aug. 21, 2014, 4:57 PM), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/livewire/steve-king-ferguson-
congressional-black-caucus. 
 146 Peter Wehner, Four Safe Bets about Obama, COMMENTARY (Jan. 30, 2009), https://www.commen
tarymagazine.com/american-society/four-safe-bets-about-obama/.   
 147 See Nina Liss-Schultz, This Woman Was Threatened With Rape After Calling Out Sexist Video Games—and 
Then Something Inspiring Happened, MOTHER JONES (May 30, 2014), https://www.motherjones.com/
media/2014/05/pop-culture-anita-sarkeesian-video-games-sexism-tropes-online-harassement-fe
minist (exploring the backlash against Anita Sarkeesian for highlighting the sexism in video games); 
Soraya Nadia McDonald, Gaming Vlogger Anita Sarkeesian is Forced 
from Home After Receiving Harrowing Death Threats, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2014, 5:23 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/08/29/gaming-vlogger-anita-
sarkeesian-is-forced-from-home-after-receiving-harrowing-death-threats/ (discussing the 
magnitude of threats against Sarkeesian, which forced her to call the police and leave her home). 
 148 Ryan Carroll, “Gamergate” is an Accountability Problem, Not a Sexism One, MODVIVE (Sept. 
1, 2014), http://www.modvive.com/2014/09/01/gamergate-accountability-problem-sexism-one/ 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20150904161911/http://www.modvive.com/2014/09/01/game
rgate-accountability-problem-sexism-one/] (criticizing the notion that threats against Sarkeesian 
are sexist) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law). 
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Ryan Carroll complained, “is a shortcut.  An ‘I win’ button.”149  He argued 
that “too often these words are used as accusations, as a way to shut  
out opposing viewpoints.  And eventually, these words will lose their 
meaning.”150 
Discourse about antisemitism moves to similar beats.  After London 
Mayor Ken Livingstone called a Jewish newspaper reporter a “German war 
criminal” and likened him to a “concentration camp guard,”151 he defiantly 
refused to apologize because “[f]or far too long the accusation of anti-
semitism has been used against anyone who is critical of the policies of the 
Israeli government.”152  Even though the exchange with the Jewish reporter 
was not actually related to Israel (Livingstone was angry that the reporter had 
sought to interview him following a party), he in effect contended that the 
allegation of antisemitism in any context should be presumed to be a 
backdoor effort to stifle criticism of Israeli policies.153  This assertion—that 
“antisemitism” typically is forwarded as a bad-faith smokescreen targeting 
critics of Israel—has become such a ubiquitous means of dismissing 
antisemitism allegations that it has become known as ‘The Livingstone 
Formulation.’154 
Nor, unfortunately, is this mode of response limited to crass columnists 
or rough politicians.  No less of an eminent authority that Jürgen Habermas 
has indulged in a similar theme.  Reacting to an essay by Peter Goodrich 
which criticized Habermas “for elaborating a notion of the ideal speech 
situation that was not inclusive of Talmudic or other diasporic or outsider 
traditions,”155 Habermas declared, “I quit reading Goodrich’s essay at the 
place where, vaguely referring to my Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, he 
accused me of defending modernity ‘against the irrationalists, the 
conservatives, the postmodernists, the heretics, the nomads and the outsiders, 
the jews.’  Anyone who suspects me of antisemitism hardly expects a response 
 
 149 Id.  Unprompted, Carroll also hastened to add that “the same goes for racism.”  Id. 
 150 Id. (analogizing Sarkeesian to the “boy who cried wolf”). 
 151 Hugh Muir, Livingstone Faces Inquiry Over Nazi Guard Jibe at Jewish Reporter, GUARDIAN 
(Feb. 11, 2005, 8:25 PM EST), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2005/feb/12/pressandpub
lishing.londonpolitics (internal citations omitted). 
 152 Ken Livingstone, An Attack on Voters’ Rights, GUARDIAN (Mar. 1, 2006, 3:29 AM EST), 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2006/mar/01/society.london.   
 153 Id.   
 154 Hirsh, supra note 88, at 91 (“It is a rhetorical device that enables the user to refuse to engage with 
the charge made, a mirror that bounces back a counter-charge of dishonest Jewish (or ‘Zionist’) 
conspiracy to a charge of antisemitism.”); see also DAVID HIRSH, CONTEMPORARY LEFT 
ANTISEMITISM 11–39 (2018) (discussing the Livingstone Formulation). 
 155 Peter Goodrich, Europe in America: Grammatology, Legal Studies, and the Politics of 
Transmission, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 2033, 2063 (2001). 
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. . . .”156  And indeed, that was that—“[t]hat is all he says.  This puts an end 
to conversation”—even though Goodrich denied that he was calling 
Habermas antisemitic at all.157 
What draws these examples together?  All of them react to specific (or 
anticipated) claims of discriminatory behavior.  And clearly, they evince 
disagreement with the underlying substantive claims (of racism, sexism, or 
antisemitism).  But none of these statements addresses the charges on their 
merits.  Rather, they suggest that the very invocation of the issue in the first 
place is illegitimate; an intentional effort to shut down conversation or 
browbeat one’s opponents into submission.  These qualities justify not a 
refutation, but the failure to even attempt one. 
The authors of these arguments are effectively arguing, not why the claim 
is wrong, but why the claim can go unaddressed.  The purported concern of 
Black leaders over police violence was taken to be a smokescreen for more 
illicit motives—publicity, popular appeal, or even profit.  Carroll’s statement 
presents a similar theme: for women to describe a constant barrage of rape 
threats as “sexism” is in his view fundamentally dishonest.  Allegations of 
sexism are taken to be inherently suspect since they (supposedly) give women 
an automatic “‘I win’ button” over ongoing social controversies.  Likewise, 
Mayor Livingstone’s comment is a general assertion that claims of 
antisemitism should not be taken seriously, as they are merely tools “used” 
to disparage those critical of Israel.  And Habermas and Wehner present no 
adornment at all—the former simply refused to accept the legitimacy of the 
conversation once (he perceived) he was accused of antisemitism, the latter 
preemptively announced that any prospective claim of racism during the 
course of the Obama presidency would be “transparently false.”158  
These assertions are not dependent on the specific substance of a 
particular claim of prejudice or discrimination.  They do not purport to 
refute the claims on their merits; they do not tell us why calling a Jewish 
reporter a Nazi is not antisemitic or why threatening to brutally assault a 
woman is not misogynistic.  Indeed, while they purport to be responsive to a 
particular claim of racism, sexism, or antisemitism, they provide a much 
wider-ranging indictment that encompasses and purports to problematize 
racism, sexism, and antisemitism claims as a class.  The particular content is 
 
 156 Jürgen Habermas, Reply to Symposium Participants, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, in HABERMAS ON 
LAW AND DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL EXCHANGES 381, 382 n.7 (Michel Rosenfeld & Andrew Arato 
eds., 1998) (quoting Peter Goodrich, Habermas and the Postal Rule, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1457, 1458 
(1996) (citations omitted)). 
 157 Goodrich, supra note 155, at 2063. 
 158 See supra notes 146–156 and accompanying text. 
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irrelevant; in fact, each of the statements at issue above could be leveled 
without knowing anything about the substance of the initial discrimination 
claim.159  
In short, the “card” response is primarily a form of dismissing 
discrimination claims.  Its purpose is not to illuminate the specific controversy 
presented by the discrimination claimant, much less provide a substantive 
refutation.  Rather, it is to justify a decision to (in Habermas’ words) “quit 
reading.”  Presenting discrimination claims as a presumptively illegitimate 
mode of argument, the “bad faith” or “card” response means that one can 
evade having to actually reckon with the substantive merits of the claimants’ 
position.160   
B.  Why Dismiss Discrimination? 
Beginning in the 1960s, psychologist Melvin Lerner began exploring the 
idea of a “just-world hypothesis”—a general belief that the world is a fair 
place where people get what they deserve.161  This belief is strongly 
motivated, however, and when events transpire that suggest the appearance 
of injustice—particularly widespread, ingrained, or systematic injustice—it is 
often easier to recalibrate one’s understanding of justice than to admit the 
existence of a very unjust world.162  The general belief that the world is a just 
place colors social judgments, making people resistant to inferences of 
injustice.163 
 
 159 See Schraub, supra note 78, at 287–88. 
 160 See supra notes 146–156 and accompanying text. 
 161 See Melvin J. Lerner & Carolyn H. Simmons, Observer’s Reaction to the “Innocent Victim”: Compassion or 
Rejection?, 4 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 203 (1966) (discussing the results of study which 
found observers of a suffering victim will reject and devalue that victim in order to satisfy the 
“observers’ need to believe in a just world”); see also Jon Hanson & Kathleen Hanson, The Blame 
Frame: Justifying (Racial) Injustice in America, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 419–20 (2006) 
(“Lerner’s results powerfully illustrate two ways in which individuals cope when witnessing 
suffering: we stop the injustice, or we justify it by conceiving of the victim as a person who actually 
‘deserves’ to suffer.”); Melvin J. Lerner & Dale T. Miller, Just World Research and the Attribution Process: 
Looking Back and Ahead, 85 PSYCHOL. BULL. 1030, 1031–32 (1978) (analyzing Lerner’s just world 
hypothesis test and stating that the findings have been replicated with “diverse populations”). 
 162 See Hanson & Hanson, supra note 161, at 420 (“[I]t is not justice that we crave so much as the perception 
of justice. And that craving can often be satisfied far more easily by changing our perception of the 
victims than by acknowledging and addressing the underlying unfairness.” (emphasis in original)). 
 163 See Melvin J. Lerner, The Justice Motive: Where Social Psychologists Found It, How They Lost It, and Why 
They May Not Find It Again, 7 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 388, 388 (2003) (“[T]he ‘just 
world’ research indicated that the desire to believe that people get what they deserve influences . . . 
social judgments . . . . ” (citations omitted)); Robbie M. Sutton & Karen M. Douglas, Justice for All, 
or Just for Me? More Evidence of the Importance of the Self-Other Distinction in Just-World Beliefs, 39 
PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 637, 638 (2005) (observing that the benefits of just 
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Obviously, a claim of discrimination is a claim of injustice and therefore 
a threat to the belief in a just world.  Such claims rest uncomfortably with 
dominant sentiments characterizing social inequality as rare, aberrational, or 
a thing of the past.  Considerable survey evidence suggests that White people 
are quite committed to the belief that racial inequities are a minimal feature 
of contemporary American life.164  This belief makes perfect sense from a 
motivational standpoint—believing that racism retains considerable potency 
suggests that the current social position of White people may be undeserved, 
whereas concluding that racism has disappeared functionally ratifies any 
tangible advantages White persons possess as the product of merit or desert.  
But the more one hears allegations of ongoing racial injustice, the harder it 
is to ignore the possibility that such injustices are more than the rare 
exception.165  Consequently, the ability to systematically dismiss 
discrimination claims as frivolous, insincere, misguided, or made in bad faith 
dissipates the threat posed by such claims and allows the broader belief in 
social egalitarianism to proceed unimpaired.166 
While this “just world” account would explain the propensity to dismiss 
any account of widespread or systematic injustice, discrimination discourse 
has particular characteristics which make dismissal especially appealing.  
 
world theory “motivate individuals to defend it against contradictory evidence, thereby minimising 
the injustices they see happening to others”). 
 164 See, e.g., Dan Balz & Scott Clement, On Racial Issues, America is Divided Both Black and White and Red and 
Blue, WASH. POST (Dec. 27, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/on-racial-issues-
america-is-divided-both-black-and-white-and-red-and-blue/2014/12/26/3d2964c8-8d12-11e4-
a085-34e9b9f09a58_story.html (relaying polls showing wide disparities between white and non-
white perceptions of the criminal justice system); Lindsey Cook, Blacks and Whites See Race Issues 
Differently, U.S. NEWS (Dec. 15, 2014, 3:14 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-
mine/2014/12/15/blacks-and-whites-see-race-issues-differently (noting wide gaps in how Black 
people and White people assess racial equality in job, educational, and housing opportunities).  As 
this Article went to press, the police killing of George Floyd and high-profile protests against other 
instances of state violence against Black Americans have precipitated a significant shift in White 
perspectives on the prevalence of racism.  See Carrie Dann, Poll: More Voters Acknowledge Symptoms of 
Racism but Disagree about its Causes, NBC NEWS (July 21, 2020), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/meet-the-press/poll-more-voters-acknowledge-symptoms-rac
ism-disagree-about-its-causes-n1234363.  But it is too early to tell whether this will translate into a 
long-term change in attitudes, or whether White opinions on this subject will eventually regress 
back to their historical mean. 
 165 See Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 96 
MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1306 (2012) (“For obvious reasons, discrimination—particularly if it is 
perceived to be common or systematic—calls into question the veracity of meritocratic belief 
systems.”); cf. Schraub, supra note 18, at 402 (noting that while the system can characterize a few 
situations where systematic injustice requires heightened judicial intervention as “isolated . . . 
aberrations of an otherwise just system[,] [i]f there are too many, though, the entire foundation of 
our constitutional democracy is called into question”). 
 166 See Schraub, supra note 78, at 290. 
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Persons who hold inegalitarian beliefs often nonetheless consciously seek to 
avoid expressing them.  This may result because they feel external social 
pressure to behave in a non-prejudiced fashion (though internally they do 
not themselves endorse those values).  But it also may occur because they 
have genuine egalitarian commitments which motivate them to suppress 
prejudiced beliefs or behaviors.167  Yet “unmanifested unconscious racist 
feelings do not go away when rejected; rather, they are reformulated, 
disguised, and adorned with trappings of logic and reason, in order to survive 
the scrutiny of the conscious mind.”168 
It is no revelation to say that race is an uncomfortable topic of discourse.  
People often say they view race as a “minefield” or that one has to “walk on 
eggshells” while discussing it.169  “Race is a tense terrain, where we often try 
to hide crucial truths from ourselves”;170 it is “defined as an illegitimate topic 
for conversation.”171  When persons are put in a position where they are 
expected to directly confront and discuss discrimination claims, they often 
evince exceptional anxiety, nervousness, anger, or fear.172  For example, in 
the fall of 2014 The Daily Show filmed a segment where they interviewed fans 
of the Washington Redskins football team who defended the name against 
charges that it was a racial slur.  During the initial stages of the interview, the 
fans simply deflected the charge: “We kept telling him that we felt the name 
 
 167 See, e.g., Ziva Kunda & Steven J. Spencer, When Do Stereotypes Come to Mind and When Do 
They Color Judgment? A Goal-Based Theoretical Framework for Stereotype Activation and 
Application, 129 PSYCH. BULL. 522, 524 (2003) (“[M]otivation to avoid prejudice may stem from 
an internally driven desire to maintain an egalitarian identity or from an externally driven desire to 
comply with egalitarian social norms.” (citations omitted)); E. Ashby Plant & Patricia G. Devine, 
Internal and External Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL., 811, 812 (1998) (discussing the difference between internal and external motivations for 
suppressing prejudiced behavior). 
 168 Edward Patrick Boyle, Note, It’s Not Easy Bein’ Green: The Psychology of Racism, Environmental 
Discrimination, and the Argument for Modernizing Equal Protection Analysis, 46 VAND. L. REV. 
937, 944 (1993) (footnote omitted). 
 169 See, e.g., Cheryl L. Wade, Attempting To Discuss Race in Business and Corporate Law Courses and Seminars, 
77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 901, 905 (2003) (“Race and racism are complex issues that are perforated 
with minefields that few Americans are able to negotiate.” (footnote omitted)); Jennifer L. Pierce, 
“Racing for Innocence”: Whiteness, Corporate Culture, and the Backlash Against Affirmative Action, 26 
QUALITATIVE SOC. 53, 60 (2003) (quoting a white attorney who felt he was “walking around on egg 
shells” when speaking about race-related issues).  
 170 Andrew Hacker, Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal, at x (1992). 
 171 Woody Doane, Rethinking Whiteness Studies, in WHITE OUT: THE CONTINUING SIGNIFICANCE OF 
RACISM 3, 13 (Ashley “Woody” Doane & Eduardo Bonilla-Silva eds., 2003). 
 172 See DiAngelo, supra note 70, at 54 (describing how White persons faced with “racial stress” often 
exhibit “a range of defensive moves” ranging from “anger, fear, and guilt” to simply “leaving the 
stress-inducing situation”). 
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honored Native Americans.”173  But several hours into the interview, the fans 
were confronted by a group of Native American activists who contended that 
the name was in fact racist and offensive.  Placed in a situation where they 
would be expected to hear and process genuine arguments from affected 
persons regarding the potential racism of “Redskins,” the fans reacted with 
extreme distress.  One contended that “It was disingenuous.  The Native 
Americans accused me of things that were so wrong.  I felt in danger.  I didn’t 
consent to that. I am going to be defamed.”174  She stormed out of the room 
and attempted to file a police report.  Another fan was upset because he 
claimed the producers had assured him there would not be “a cross-panel 
discussion” with the Native Americans.175  While he understood that Native 
American participants would contribute to the Daily Show segment, he did 
not expect that he would have to confront their argument on a personal 
level.176 
This is a particularly striking example of a presumably uncontroversial 
point: being implicated in a claim of discrimination is uncomfortable.  Being 
forced to defend oneself against such a claim is even more uncomfortable.  
Claims of discrimination create dissonance between conscious self-
conception (as non-racist) and others’ assertions regarding how one should 
behave.  The resultant anxiety creates a negative association surrounding 
these sorts of interactions—we do not like the people who typically prompt 
these feelings of agitation.  This creates a feedback loop where negative 
attitudes about the group are reinforced.  Importantly, this negative appraisal 
of the claimant does not depend on the claim being false—“legitimate claims 
of racism also antagonize and alienate those who are accused.”177 
Hence, when everyday persons consider how to think about race (or other 
similar identities), they will favor conceptions that are “informative, but also 
 
 173 Ian Shapira, The Daily Show Springs Tense Showdown with Native Americans on Redskins Fans, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/the-daily-show-springs-showdown-with-
native-americans-on-redskins-fans/2014/09/19/c6c5f936-3f73-11e4-b03f-de718edeb92f_story.h
tml. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
176  After years of pressure, the Washington team announced in 2020 that the name would be retired.  
As this article went to press the new name has not yet been selected.  See Les Carpenter, 
Washington’s NFL Team to Retire Redskins Name, Following Sponsor Pressure and Calls for Change, WASH. 
POST (July 13, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2020/07/13/redskins-change-
name-announcement/ 
 177 Julie C. Suk, Race Without Cards?, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 111, 116 (2009) (reviewing FORD, infra 
note 182).  This antagonism can result even in the clearest of cases.  See Michael J. Bazyler, Litigating 
the Holocaust, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 601, 626 n.89 (1999) (citing a Swiss Government report which 
“found that anti-Semitism in Switzerland had grown as a result of the claims made against the Swiss 
banks and other Swiss institutions by World War II Jewish survivors”). 
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nonthreatening.”178  The ultimate goal underlying most people’s theories of 
racism is to “allow them to maintain a safe distance from any appearance of 
personal bias.”179  Dismissal is one mechanism creating such “safe 
distance”—if a claim of bias can be brushed off as inherently ridiculous, then 
no more work needs to be done to reinforce the preferred unbiased image of 
the self. 
C.  How Discrimination is Dismissed 
The “card” retort provides the paradigm case of dismissal, and the 
previous section demonstrates why that response is so valuable.  But what 
specific rationales do people use to justify dismissing discrimination?  
Sometimes, the rationale is predicated on explicit statements deriding the 
credibility of the affected group as epistemic agents—these claims are just 
what you would expect from those people.180  Such portrayals were discussed 
above as cases of testimonial injustice, wherein bias against the speaker 
prevents their discursive contributions from receiving due consideration.181  
But often the rationale actually relies on hidden normative appraisals about 
what discrimination does and does not entail that render wide swathes of 
claims either unintelligible or superficially implausible.  The problem is not 
with the appraisals themselves (though they might have problems); so long as 
persons adopting these appraisals are willing to engage in a meta-debate 
about their validity, the issue is not one of dismissal.  But frequently they are 
not, and instead these particular and contestable understandings of 
discrimination are wielded as a tool to avoid having a substantive 
conversation about the merits of the particular claim. 
1.  Heightened Seriousness, Reduced Scope 
One common objection registered against discrimination claims is that 
they seek to exploit the moral seriousness of discrimination—the grave 
 
 178 Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Lay Theories About White Racists: What Constitutes Racism 
(and What Doesn’t), 9 GROUP PROCESS & INTERGROUP REL. 117, 119 (2006). 
 179 Id. 
 180 For example, Caryl Churchill dismissed Howard Jacobson’s contention that her play, Seven Jewish 
Children, was antisemitic by calling that claim, “the usual tactic.”  Caryl Churchill, My Play Is Not 
Anti-Semitic, in Letters: Jacobson on Gaza, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 21, 2009, 1:00 AM), http://www.ind
ependent.co.uk/voices/letters/letters-jacobson-on-gaza-1628191.html (responding to Howard 
Jacobson, Opinion, Let’s See the ‘Criticism’ of Israel for What It 
Really Is, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 18, 2009, 1:00 AM), http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comme
ntators/howard-jacobson/howard-jacobson-letrsquos-see-the-criticism-of-israel-for-what-it-really-
is-1624827.html). 
 181 See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. 
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wrongfulness of racism, sexism, antisemitism, etc.—for wrongs which are far 
more mundane.  For example, Richard Thompson Ford contends that 
claims of racial bias or prejudice can be an illegitimate argumentative tactic 
because they unfairly summon the specter of an extreme evil—conscious, 
malign racial antipathy of the form associated with the Jim Crow South—
and attribute it willy-nilly to contemporary persons who almost certainly lack 
such an attitude.182 
I have suggested before that there may be an inverse correlation between 
how people perceive the “severity” of a norm (how wrong is racial 
discrimination?) and its “scope” (what behaviors are encompassed under the 
ambit of “racial discrimination”).183  For example, if “discrimination” means 
something as egregiously terrible as Jim Crow America, then people will be 
reticent to include relatively commonplace or ambiguous situations under 
the term’s domain.  The practice of dismissal suggests that this dynamic can 
be deliberately harnessed for tactical ends.  By framing the charge of 
discrimination in severe terms, it can be waved aside as inherently ridiculous 
when applied to anything but the most overt and uncontroversial instances 
of the wrong.184  This, in turn, allows one to evade considering other, more 
realistic potential connections between everyday challenged conduct and 
racial wrongdoing. 
In this light, it is notable that the charge of “playing the race card” is not 
leveled only against claims of overt, conscious racial hostility.  Indeed, one of 
the more interesting facets of “race card” discourse is how it is deployed even 
where the initial claimant seems to accept that the target is not the modern-
day incarnate of George Wallace.185  Many articulations of racism seek not 
 
 182 See RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, THE RACE CARD: HOW BLUFFING ABOUT BIAS MAKES RACE 
RELATIONS WORSE 58–59 (2008).  Ford’s argument is essentially one of the “persuasive 
definition,” first articulated by Charles Stevenson, wherein people capitalize on the emotive content 
of a particular term (like “racism”) while altering its conceptual content to fit a new substantive 
agenda.  See generally Charles Leslie Stevenson, Persuasive Definitions, 47 MIND 331, 331 (1938) 
(showing that “[a] persuasive definition[,] . . . which gives a new conceptual meaning to a familiar 
word without substantially changing its emotive meaning,” can lead to important philosophical 
confusions when there is widespread failure to recognize these definitions as persuasive definitions, 
which can be analogized to racism (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 183 See, e.g., Schraub, supra note 78, at 290 (hypothesizing that “there is an inverse relationship between 
how people perceive the severity of an ambiguous norm and how they perceive its scope”); Schraub, 
supra note 70, at 1300–01 (showing that opposing racism has become a universal moral norm but 
there is not a universal understanding or definition of racism). 
 184 See, e.g., Schraub, supra note 78, at 291. 
 185 See Suk, supra note 177, at 117 (using the 2008 U.S. presidential election as an example of 
inadvertent racial hostility—noting that then-Senator Obama accused McCain of igniting 
“Americans’ subconscious fear of electing the nation’s first black president,” which McCain in turn 
described as playing the race card). 
1368 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 22:5 
to uncover cases of extreme evil but rather ordinary failures of the sort that 
it is perfectly reasonable to associate with normal individuals.  Yet persons 
respond to these relatively mundane claims of racial injustice by converting 
them into extraordinary declarations about the depraved hearts of everyday 
Americans.  Doing so allows the respondent to then pivot to an aggrieved 
protest against the extreme and disproportionate charge that so obviously 
outstrips whatever minor misstep may have been made. 
The conservative response to the Obama Administration’s statements on 
Ferguson are keenly illustrative—despite the relatively measured character 
of the latter, they were quickly reframed as extraordinary declarations of 
widespread culpability in a deliberate project of racist domination.186  
Indeed, the allure of the “‘race card’ card” is such that it emerges even when 
the declarants do not mention race at all.  For example, when Eric Holder 
complained about uncivil attacks against himself and the President (without 
mentioning race), Washington Post columnist Kathleen Parker saw through the 
ruse: “True, Holder didn’t say anything specifically racial — he’s far too 
smart for that — but aren’t we too smart to believe race isn’t what he 
meant?”187  She inferred that Holder was calling his critics racial bigots so 
that she could airily dismiss the insinuation that his critics were racial bigots. 
In discussions over sexual violence, this dynamic is if anything even more 
pronounced.  As Kate Manne writes: “We assure ourselves that real rapists 
will appear on our radars either as devils, decked out with horns and 
pitchforks, or else as monsters—that is, as creepy and ghoulish creatures.  
Monsters are unintelligible, uncanny, and they are outwardly frightening.”188  
But, she continues, what is actually “frightening about rapists is partly the 
lack of identifying marks and features, beyond the fact that they are by far 
more likely to be men.  Rapists are human, all too human, and they are very 
much among us.  The idea of rapists as monsters exonerates by 
caricature.”189  
In her book, Real Rape, Susan Estrich says that “the law’s abhorrence of 
the rapist in stranger cases . . . has been matched only by its distrust of the 
victim who claims to have been raped by a friend or neighbor or 
acquaintance.”190  But it is more than just a match: the abhorrence is what 
 
 186 See supra notes 143–145 and accompanying text. 
 187 Kathleen Parker, Erasing the Race Card, WASH. POST (April 15, 2014), http://www.washington
post.com/opinions/kathleen-parker-erasing-the-race-card/2014/04/15/5d774e9e-c4da-11e3-b1
95-dd0c1174052c_story.html. 
 188 Kate Manne, Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny 199 (2017). 
 189 Id. 
 190 Susan Estrich, Real Rape 4 (1987). 
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constitutes the mistrust.  The abhorrence of rape is, in a real sense, what 
allows or even demands the mistrust of the vast majority of rape victims.  It 
is for this reason that men who have a stake in contesting an accusation of 
rape, or in opposing an expansion of laws criminalizing sexual assault, will 
often be the most invested in declaring that such crimes represent “serious 
accusations.”191  Rape, they tell us quite earnestly, is a monstrous crime.  And 
as a monstrous crime, it cannot apply in circumstances that feel distinctively 
human and recognizable—or committed by persons who are occupying 
positions and inhabit identities that seem normally human.  This discourse 
focuses obsessively on cases involving “grey areas”—supposedly unclear 
signals, the “mature for her age” minor under the age of consent, 
intoxication, cases where no force was used, seduction versus coercion, and 
the line between “mere” unenthusiasm and explicit lack of consent.  These 
are cases involving perpetrators who present more complicated postures than 
unbridled, violent, bestial lust.  Their conduct is presented as judgment calls 
where one can imagine ordinary individuals—not abhorrent, not 
monstrous—falling on the wrong side of the line.  But rape’s abhorrent 
character goes hand-in-hand with its aberrational status—the conceptual 
boundaries of rape and sexual violence are delineated precisely by that which 
is not ordinary or a matter of “judgment.” 
The problem is that once you shear off all the cases that are plausibly 
“ordinary,” you have written out the vast majority of rape cases.  At that 
point, “rape” cannot do any more than idiosyncratic work.  All the cases of 
sexual violence which fall outside of the most stereotypically monstrous 
form—date rape, spousal rape, cases involving intoxication, cases that lack 
outward markers of physical force or resistance—will systematically be 
excluded from the term.  And that exclusion is no accident—it is functional, 
a mechanism of ensuring that many if not most cases of sexual violence and 
exploitation are rendered unnamable and immunized from most forms of 
social (to say nothing of legal) redress.  Manne therefore states bluntly: “That 
misogynist violence and sexual assault are generally perpetrated by 
 
 191 See, e.g., Chris Huffman, Opinion, The Dangers of False Allegations, CROOKSTON TIMES (Oct. 25, 
2018, 10:49 AM), https://www.crookstontimes.com/opinion/20181025/letter-dangers-of-false-
allegations (“You see, rape is a serious matter.  Not only is it a crime, but it is life destroying and 
morally destitute.  Accusing someone of this, particularly in a small community, can destroy a 
reputation.”); Peter Wood, The Meaning of Sex, WEEKLY STANDARD (May 4, 2015, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/the-meaning-of-sex (“Let me repeat: 
Actual rape is a serious crime which calls for the serious response of law enforcement.  The gravity 
of that crime, however, is obscured by rhetoric that treats other kinds of sexual encounters as though 
they were rape.”). 
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unremarkable, non-monstrous-seeming people must be accepted if things are 
to improve in this arena . . . .”192 
This strategy—elevating the moral seriousness of discrimination claims 
as a defensive move to delegitimize their applicability in specific cases—has 
also found a home in the judiciary’s interpretation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.  In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, for example, the Supreme 
Court addressed whether classifications discriminating against the disabled 
should receive heightened judicial scrutiny (akin to that provided for racial 
or gender classifications).193  The Court expressed concern that providing 
such protections to the disabled would make it “difficult to find a principled 
way to distinguish a variety of other groups” which desired similar 
protections, e.g., “the aging, . . . the mentally ill, and the infirm.”194  Granting 
that the disabled do suffer from at least some degree of political powerlessness 
and prejudice, the Court nonetheless fretted that “much economic and social 
legislation would [also] be suspect” under any rationale which could justify 
heightened protection in this case.195  In McCleskey v. Kemp, the Court faced a 
similar dilemma when presented with rigorous statistical evidence 
demonstrating racial disparities in the imposition of capital punishment.196  
Noting that similar arguments could be made against the entire project of 
criminal sentencing, the Court refused to consider the defendant’s argument 
that aggregate proof of discriminatory application was a rationale for 
reversing his death sentence.197  Allowing a sentence to be overturned 
because of general statistical proof of discriminatory practice “throws into 
serious question the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice 
system”198—a position the dissent characterized as “a fear of too much 
justice.”199 
To be clear, there are legitimate reasons for the judiciary to tread lightly 
when it elects to substitute its own judgment for those of democratically 
accountable bodies.200  Kenji Yoshino is undoubtedly correct that there are 
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 193 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 194 Id. at 445–46. 
 195 Id. at 445. 
 196 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 197 Id. at 314–15. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 200 This rationale has stronger force in the Cleburne tiered-scrutiny context, where the courts are 
determining whether to invalidate legislative classifications, than in the McCleskey criminal law 
context.  Disparities in sentencing, at least when not the product of legislatively-enacted sentencing 
ranges, are largely endogenous to the judiciary and thus do not substantially implicate democratic 
legitimacy problems. 
August 2020] DELIBERATION AND DISMISSAL 1371 
practical limits to the number of instances where courts can aggressively 
intervene in democratic policymaking.201  But his precise choice of verbiage 
is interesting: “the Court can never give heightened scrutiny to classifications 
of, say, twenty groups without diluting the meaning of that scrutiny.”202  The 
verb “diluting” is a suggestive choice: serious problems must be scarce; if the 
judiciary intervenes too often, it necessarily implies that the problems it is 
attacking are not particularly dangerous.  
Perhaps the most striking examples of this dynamic can be found in the 
gay marriage context.  In his dissenting opinion in United States v. Windsor,203 
Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that same-sex marriage bans had long 
been thought to be “essential” to the definition of marriage and that the 
Defense of Marriage Act enjoyed wide support in Congress (earning 342 
votes in the House and 85 in the Senate, not to mention the President’s 
signature).204  These factors should have made the Court reticent to “tar the 
political branches with the brush of bigotry.”205  Justice Alito registered the 
same complaint: the plaintiffs in Windsor “ask us to rule that the presence of 
two members of the opposite sex is as rationally related to marriage as white 
skin is to voting or a Y-chromosome is to the ability to administer an 
estate. . . .  Acceptance of the argument would cast all those who cling to 
traditional beliefs about the nature of marriage in the role of bigots or 
superstitious fools.”206 
Judge Jeffrey Sutton’s opinion in DeBoer v. Snyder might be the most 
devoted to the theme.207  DeBoer was the first federal appellate opinion after 
Windsor to uphold a state gay marriage ban,208 and Judge Sutton focused on 
the commonality of anti-gay marriage sentiment as a reason to reject a 
constitutional finding of animus.  He noted the history: the laws simply 
“codified a long-existing, widely held social norm already reflected in state 
law.”209  He relied on raw numbers: “The number of people who supported 
 
 201 Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 762 (2011) 
 202 Id. 
 203 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (striking down portions of the Defense of Marriage Act). 
 204 Id. at 776 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 205 Id.  Chief Justice Roberts returned to this theme when objecting to the majority’s due process 
analysis in Obergefell v. Hodges. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2624 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting 
Schuette v. BAMN, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1637 (2014) (“It is demeaning to the democratic process to 
presume that voters are not capable of deciding an issue of this sensitivity on decent and rational 
grounds.”)). 
 206 Windsor, 570 U.S. at 813 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 207 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 208 See Erik Eckholm, Court Upholds Marriage Bans in Four States, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/07/us/appeals-court-upholds-same-sex-marriage-ban.html. 
 209 DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 408. 
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each initiative—Michigan (2.7 million), Kentucky (1.2 million), Ohio (3.3 
million), and Tennessee (1.4 million)—was large and surely diverse.”210  And 
he explicitly blurred those facts regarding commonality with a normative 
assessment of the enactor’s motives: “[T]he decision to place the definition 
of marriage in a State’s constitution [was not] unusual, nor did it otherwise 
convey the kind of malice or unthinking prejudice the Constitution prohibits.  
Nineteen States did the same thing during that period.”211  Given the breadth 
of support, Judge Sutton concluded, it would be “unfair to paint the 
proponents of the measures as a monolithic group of hate-mongers.”212 
All three judges are making a similar rhetorical move—actually, two 
rhetorical moves.  On the one hand, they elevate the moral seriousness of a 
decision to strike down gay marriage bans—it entails, they say, labeling gay 
marriage opponents “bigots,” “irrational,” and “hate-mongers.”  On the 
other hand, they observe that opposition to gay marriage has been the norm 
throughout most of American history and still enjoys considerable support 
today.  They suggest that it is implausible to assert that such large quantities 
of Americans can justly be described in such vitriolic terms.213  One 
immediately senses the trap: if declaring a law unconstitutional as an equal-
protection violation means “tar[ring] the political branches with the brush of 
bigotry,”214 and it is implausible to declare that wide swaths of Americans are 
bigoted, then it follows that nothing (or at least, nothing outside of truly 
idiosyncratic local enactments) is an equal-protection violation. 
It is therefore unsurprising that only those supporting the 
constitutionality of bans on gay marriage—such as the dissenters in Windsor 
and the majority in DeBoer—ever use the words “bigot” or “hate-monger” to 
characterize gay-marriage opponents.215  Framing the expressive content of 
a validated claim of legal discrimination in such explosive terms is a defensive 
move meant to weaken the intuitive plausibility of the claim.  To support an 
equal-protection violation is to be a moral monster, it is implausible that 
 
 210 Id. at 409. 
 211 Id. at 408. 
 212 Id. at 410. 
 213 Cf. George Tsai, An Error Theory for Liberal Universalism, 21 J. POL. PHIL. 305, 311 (2013) (contending 
that moral explanations which rely on believing that virtually everyone is “stupid or wicked or 
something along those lines” just “lack[] the ring of truth”). 
 214 Windsor, 570 U.S. at 776 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 215 See, e.g., id. at 813 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that according heightened scrutiny to laws which 
restrict marriage to heterosexual couples “cast all those who cling to traditional beliefs about the 
nature of marriage in the role of bigots or superstitious fools”); DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 410 (“It is . . . 
unfair to paint the proponents of the measures as a monolithic group of hate-mongers.”); 
Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 361 (N.Y. 2006) (“A court should not lightly conclude that 
everyone who held this belief [against gay marriage] was irrational, ignorant or bigoted.”). 
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many Americans are monstrous, hence, an equal-protection claim 
challenging widely supported conduct is inherently implausible and can be 
rejected.216 
This argument has resonance outside of the courts as well.  For example, 
some have urged that claims of discrimination be made only in the most 
clear-cut cases, so as not to exhaust the patience of the broader 
community.217  Ford worries that:  
The good-natured humanitarian who listens attentively to the first claim 
of social injustice will become an impatient curmudgeon after multiple 
similar admonishments. . . .  The growing number of social groups making 
claims to civil rights protection threatens the political and practical viability 
of civil rights for those who need them most.218  
Latent in this concern is the belief that presenting discrimination as a 
regular facet of life—something that exists in normal or ambiguous situations 
and not just obvious forms of rabid hatred—is to discount its seriousness.219  
This belief justifies preemptively dismissing many discrimination claims that 
are not overt or unambiguous on both definitional and tactical grounds.  In 
this way, the very rhetoric that seems to take discrimination claims 
“seriously”—viewing them as exceedingly grave violations of the norms of 
democratic life—acts to insulate many such cases from substantive public 
review. 
 
 216 See Schraub, supra note 78, at 290. 
 217 See, e.g., FORD, supra note 182, at 339 (worrying that if too many believe that the “serious charge of 
racism has become a ploy used for undeserved advantage, the antiracist goodwill we currently enjoy 
may give way to a pervasive attitude of cynical indifference”); STEPHEN WALT & JOHN 
MEARSHEIMER, THE ISRAEL LOBBY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 196 (2007) (claiming that the 
“blurring” of “true anti-Semitism . . . makes it harder to fight true bigotry”); Peter Wallsten, Center 
for American Progress, Group Tied to Obama, Under Fire from Israel Advocates, WASH. POST 
(Jan. 19, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/center-for-america-progress-group-
tied-to-obama-accused-of-anti-semitic-language/2012/01/17/gIQAcrHXAQ_story.html 
(quoting J Street President Jeremy Ben-Ami as urging Jews to “tread lightly” around accusations of 
antisemitism because otherwise “people won’t take you seriously”). 
 218 FORD, supra note 182, at 176. 
 219 From another angle, David Oppenheimer promotes his concept of “negligent discrimination” 
precisely because it detaches the concept of “discrimination” from one of “moral wrongfulness” 
and therefore expands the class of cases where a victim of discrimination can gain redress.  David 
Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 970–71 (1992); see also 
Freeman, supra note 20, at 1052–53 (distinguishing between the “victim” perspective on anti-
discrimination law, which focuses on the material conditions experienced by members of the 
underclass, and the “perpetrator” perspective, which focuses on the inappropriate conduct of those 
accused of engaging in illegitimate discrimination). 
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2.  Intentionality and Epistemic Privilege 
One wide-spread understanding of “discrimination” is that an action is 
discriminatory if and only if it results from conscious and intentional bias 
against a particular group.220  In law, this conception is operationalized as a 
requirement of discriminatory intent: a plaintiff alleging discrimination must 
demonstrate that the alleged discriminator acted due to some sort of illicit 
animus against a protected identity characteristic.221  The intentionality 
requirement can and has been criticized for being unduly narrow—failing to 
include both implicit biases that commonly characterize aversive racism as 
well as structural barriers to equality that minority members might face.222  
There is, however, a less-recognized role this definition plays in enabling the 
dismissal of discrimination claims.  By placing the key facts underlying a 
discrimination claim in the minds of those accused, this understanding of 
discrimination places the respondents in an epistemically privileged position 
vis-à-vis the claimant. 
“Epistemic privilege” generally refers to the claim that certain individuals 
possess a particular standpoint which is not just different but advantageous 
vis-à-vis other perspectives on reality.223  The enlightenment model accorded 
 
 220 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 477, 480 (2007) (critiquing a “narrow” view “that treats discrimination as a wrong perpetrated 
by a discriminator who acts self-consciously and irrationally”); Eyer, supra note 165, at 1300 
(“Perhaps the most striking finding of psychology scholars . . . is that the intent of the perpetrator is 
a critical determinant of observers’ willingness to make attributions to discrimination.”); FORD, 
supra note 182, at 180 (“Most people think unlawful discrimination is a decision motivated by animus 
or bias”). 
 221 See, e.g., Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 253 (1981) (“The ultimate 
burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the 
plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.”); Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 
279 (1979) (concluding that a governmental action must be taken “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite 
of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group” to constitute an equal protection violation). 
 222 See Freeman, supra note 20, at 1054–55 (arguing that the focus on identifying a discrete perpetrator 
harboring discriminatory animus is predicated on a need to declare most actors “innocent” and 
thus not liable for bearing the burden of rectifying allegedly discriminatory conduct); Oppenheimer, 
supra note 219, at 916 (“If whites are frequently unaware of their own racism, a theory of 
employment discrimination that focuses on an intent to discriminate provides no remedy for most 
discrimination.”). 
 223 See, e.g., SANDRA HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE? WHOSE KNOWLEDGE? THINKING FROM 
WOMEN’S LIVES 121 (1991) (asserting that marginalized persons will typically carry a standpoint 
which is “less partial and less distorted” than competing social outlooks); Eric Blumenson, Mapping 
the Limits of Skepticism in Law and Morals, 74 TEX. L. REV. 523, 556 (1996) (“Arguably, those on the 
bottom might possess an epistemic privilege resulting from a kind of dual vision: They are able to 
compare prevailing, legitimating ideologies with the realities of their lives, and thereby reveal 
injustices that would otherwise remain invisible to others.”).  For a skeptical, albeit sympathetic, 
view, see Bat-Ami Bar On, Marginality and Epistemic Privilege, in FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGIES 83 
(Linda Alcoff & Elizabeth Potter eds., 1993). 
August 2020] DELIBERATION AND DISMISSAL 1375 
epistemic privilege as a class to persons with formal academic training, who 
utilize the scientific method, and who in general stand as objective, 
“unmarked” observers.224  Feminist philosophers turned this model on its 
head and asserted that oppressed persons occupied an epistemically 
privileged position because (among other reasons) they could draw on both 
their social knowledge of pervasive dominant norms as well as their personal 
(but socially-suppressed) knowledge derived from their experience as 
oppressed.225  Others express skepticism regarding whether any group of 
persons should be considered to possess epistemic privilege as a general 
matter.226 
But whether or not we believe that there is a class of epistemically 
privileged persons generally, it seems evident and inescapable that particular 
models of understanding a given social phenomenon privilege the outlook of 
certain people in certain situations.  With respect to the question “what 
emotion is Jane feeling right now,” Jane is in an epistemically privileged 
position compared to most, if not all, other observers to articulate the right 
answer.227  Certainly, this does not imply that Jane is generally epistemically 
privileged in her response to any question—her authority stems instead from 
the specific context governing how we observe, assess, and understand 
emotions.  Nor does this necessarily mean Jane’s vocalized response to the 
question is unimpeachable—she may be lying.  It does not even demand that 
her (sincere) appraisal is correct—she might be confused.  It is possible that 
in some circumstances a trained therapist, given time and proper equipment, 
could come up with a “better” answer to the question than Jane would.  
Nonetheless, it is generally the case that Jane’s articulation of what Jane is 
feeling will be given greater credence than competing opinions proffered by 
others.  Hence, if we believe that the decisive question governing the answer 
 
 224 See Marianne Janack, Standpoint Epistemology Without the “Standpoint”?: An Examination of Epistemic 
Privilege and Epistemic Authority, 12 HYPATIA 125, 133–34 (1997) (“One is supposed to have epistemic 
privilege . . . because of one’s knowledge situation.”); Bar On, supra note 223, at 85–88. 
 225 Janack, supra note 224, at 126 (concluding that “while theories developed by members of dominant 
groups will reflect only the interests and values of those groups, theories developed by the oppressed 
will encompass a broader array of interests and experiences”); see also Pohlhaus Jr., supra note 99, at 
721 (asserting that “the epistemic resources developed from marginalized situatedness will be suited 
to more of the experienced world in general” and such “marginally situated knowers . . . develop 
epistemic resources more adequate for making sense of more parts of the experienced world”). 
 226 See Bar On, supra note 223, at 97. 
 227 See Donald Davidson, First Person Authority, 38 DIALECTICA 101, 101 (1984) (“When a speaker avers 
that he has a belief, hope, desire or intention, there is a presumption that he is not mistaken . . . .”); 
John Heil, Privileged Access, 97 MIND 238, 238 (1988) (“I know my own states of mind immediately 
and with confidence.  You may discover what I am thinking, of course, but you are liable to err in 
your assessment of my thoughts in ways that I cannot.”). 
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to a given moral controversy is “what emotion is Jane feeling,” then Jane is 
an epistemically privileged position with respect to how we assess that 
controversy.  More broadly, the possession of epistemic privilege in any 
particular case depends on what is believed to establish the truth of a 
proposition as an initial matter in specific situations.228  A person in a 
privileged position under one model may be viewed with suspicion and 
mistrust under another. 
The intentionalist model of discrimination is epistemically self-
privileging.  By this I mean that, under the intentionalist model, whether an 
action constitutes “discrimination” depends on information or appraisals 
that the subject of the discrimination claim (the person who allegedly is acting 
in a discriminatory fashion) is in a privileged position to be able to assess.  
And an epistemically self-privileging theory of discrimination greatly enables 
the practice of dismissal.  David Hirsh describes the mechanics in 
characteristically lucid fashion when discussing the dismissal of antisemitism 
(though the logic applies to other “-ism” claims as well).  Persons confronted 
with the charge of antisemitism: 
find it easier to look within themselves and to find they are not intentionally 
antisemitic, indeed they are opponents of antisemitism.  Intimate access to 
the object of inquiry yields an apparently clear result and seems to make it 
unnecessary for the antiracist to look any further . . . .229 
Once it is “clear” that the label is false, it is perfectly reasonable to dismiss 
the claim without additional consideration.  What more do we need to know?  
But this move assumes that a particular, narrow definition of antisemitism—
one confined to conscious antipathy towards Jews—occupies the field.230  
Giving such a definition this type of pre-deliberative primacy is not the 
conclusion of an open discussion but a gatekeeper standing athwart its 
commencement. 
Intentionalist theories of discrimination—whereby one only is implicated 
in “discrimination” if that is one’s intention or purpose—hinge on 
epistemically self-privileging factual assessments.  To be sure, one could 
argue the contrary—we might believe that people are unreliable appraisers 
of their own mental states, particularly if we factor in subconscious 
prejudices.  Indeed, this potential counterargument may also explain the 
 
 228 See PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND 
THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 202–03 (1990) (“Epistemological choices about who to trust, 
what to believe, and why something is true . . . . tap the fundamental question of which versions of 
truth will prevail and shape thought and action.”). 
 229 Hirsh, supra note 88, at 91. 
 230 See id. (noting that this posture implicitly dismisses the possibility of antisemitism that exists beyond 
individual conscious hostile attitudes). 
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resistance to incorporating subconscious theories of discrimination—they 
undermine one of the primary, if unstated, “advantages” of conscious 
theories of discrimination (namely, that they put those accused of 
discrimination in a position of epistemic privilege from where they can easily 
dismiss the allegation).231  
Nonetheless, the idea that “access to one’s own mental states is infallible 
and incorrigible” runs deep and is easily accepted as a baseline 
assumption.232  Having adopted this view, a discrimination claim easily be 
brushed off—one hears the charge, quickly checks one’s own mental state, 
and concludes that one is not harboring malign attitudes towards the 
supposed victim.  From that conclusion, it follows that the discrimination 
claim is obviously unsubstantiated and can be dismissed.  None of this 
requires any sort of engagement with any evidence or argument the claimant 
might otherwise bring to bear.  This is preferable to relying on motivated 
cognition because it is less cognitively taxing and eliminates the possibility 
that sufficiently strong evidence will force them to admit the existence of 
prejudice or discrimination.233  Through this mechanism, the theory is self-
insulating—since it is adopted because of its utility in avoiding critical 
reflection regarding discrimination, it is implemented in such a way as to 
negate the necessity of such reflection. 
At one level, this method of dismissing discrimination claims might seem 
to have less purchase in the courtroom, since third-party judges lack direct 
access to the mental states of the alleged discriminator and so cannot rely on 
them to dispose of claims.234  That is, it does them no good to look into their 
own minds and judge themselves innocent, since they are judging someone 
 
 231 Compare Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 67 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1080 (2006) (challenging the validity of implicit bias measures because they 
supposedly do not “tap[] into racial attitudes—at least attitudes in the commonsense view that the 
attitudes imply an evaluative preference that, when brought to people’s attention, they endorse and 
are even prepared to justify under appropriate conditions”), with R. Richard Banks, Jennifer L. 
Eberhardt & Lee Ross, Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 
1169, 1186–87 (2006) (noting that criticisms of implicit bias measures often rest on normative 
disagreements regarding the meaning of discrimination rather than scientific objections). 
 232 Heil, supra note 227, at 238; see also Quentin Skinner, Motives, Intentions, and the Interpretation of Texts, 
in MEANING & CONTEXT: QUENTIN SKINNER AND HIS CRITICS 68, at 76–77 (James Tully ed., 
1988) (“It is true that any agent is obviously in a privileged position when characterizing his own 
intentions and actions.  It follows that it must always be dangerous, and ought perhaps to be 
unusual, for a critic to override a writer’s own explicit statements on this point.”). 
 233 See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Comment, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 
1016, 1030 (1988) (suggesting that the requirement of conscious discriminatory intent exists so that 
we can “reject[] civil rights claims that threaten . . . [White] psyches” (emphasis in original) (citations 
omitted)). 
 234 See supra notes 227–228 and accompanying text. 
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else’s mindset.  In practice, however, the intentionality requirement plays an 
important role in enabling the early dismissal of discrimination cases. 
For starters, sometimes judges can look into their own minds as a proxy 
for the mindset of the alleged discriminator—if, for example, they have 
engaged in similar conduct or spoken similar words as that which is alleged 
to provide proof of discriminatory motive.  Assuming, as seems likely, that 
the judge does not view him or herself as harboring discriminatory animus,235 
they will likewise be reticent to conclude that identical acts by another party 
suffices to make out such proof.236 
The gay marriage cases almost certainly provide an example.237  Several 
of the conservative judges who voted against concluding that gay marriage 
bans evinced anti-gay animus stressed how common sentiment opposing gay 
marriage has been in the United States.  That general demographic 
observation makes it overwhelmingly likely that at least some of those judges 
themselves opposed gay marriage, or at least did so in the recent past. 
Nonetheless, those judges almost certainly did not conceive of themselves as 
harboring discriminatory animus against LGBT persons by virtue of 
adopting that position—that is, they can (or they think they can) use their 
own experience as proof that an anti-gay motive is not a necessary condition 
for opposing gay marriage.  So when the plaintiffs argued that support for 
such policies is properly attributed to unlawful animus, judges who 
themselves have backed those laws could dismiss the inference—after all, the 
judges have first-hand knowledge (under the intentionalist framework of 
understanding discrimination, at least) that some proponents of gay marriage 
bans are wholly innocent of the charge. 
But even where there is not a direct parallel between the judge’s state of 
mind and the defendant’s, there remains a more mundane problem: the 
 
 235 Cf. Laurie T. O'Brien, Christian S. Crandall, April Horstman‐Reser, Ruth Warner, AnGelica 
Alsbrooks & Alison Blodorn, But I’m No Bigot: How Prejudiced White Americans Maintain Unprejudiced 
Self‐Images, 40 J. APP. SOC. PSYCHOL. 917 (2010) (exploring the “paradox” of how White Americans 
can possess racial prejudice yet maintain a self-conception as unprejudiced). 
 236 This is one of several circumstances where a deliberative actor might have an incentive not just to 
defend themselves from charges of discrimination, but defend others like them as well.  See Susan 
Condor, Lia Figgou, Jackie Abell, Stephen Gibson & Clifford Stevenson, ‘They’re Not Racist . . .’ 
Prejudice Denial, Mitigation and Suppression in Dialogue, 45 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 441, 442–43 (2006) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Teun A. van Dijk, Discourse and the Denial of Racism,  3 
DISCOURSE & SOC’Y 87, 89 (1992)) (noting that “social actors may, on occasion, attempt to deny 
prejudice on behalf of groups to which they belong” because they “resent being perceived as 
racists,” both as individuals and members of society). 
 237 See supra notes 203–214 and accompanying text. 
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plaintiff carries the burden of proving discriminatory intent,238 but it is the 
defendant who is in an epistemically privileged position regarding that 
critical fact.  Just as there is a healthy presumption of deference to our 
hypothetical Jane regarding her own articulation of her emotional state, so 
too is it understandable for judges to presume at the outset that a person 
alleged to have engaged in discrimination has more reliable access to their 
own state of mind than does the person making the allegation.239  Yet 
discrimination case plaintiffs must virtually always convince judges of the 
opposite—that their second-hand assessment of the mindset of the defendant 
is more reliable than a first-hand declaration.  Absent cases where the 
plaintiff is fortuitous enough to have direct indications of discriminatory 
animus, it is far from clear what sort of evidence could definitively show that 
the defendant thought something he or she denies thinking.240  And so again, 
the intentionalist requirement of discrimination may predispose judges to 
believe that discrimination claims simply do not “ring true.”241 
These problems, of course, track with more general criticisms of the 
intentionalist model.242  That said, the concern being articulated here rests 
not on the substance of intentionalist theories of discrimination, but the 
discourse-suppressing practices they enable.  There might also be substantive 
problems with intentionalist models, but the danger this Section is focusing 
on is that, through dismissal, they enable us to avoid reasoned consideration 
of other conceptions of discrimination.  An intentionalist theory of 
discrimination need not suppress debate over competing theories if it is 
adopted as a starting position and its adherents recognize that it must be 
 
 238 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (citation omitted) (“The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that 
the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the 
plaintiff.”); see also Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE 
L.J. 2117, 2189 (1996) (citations omitted) (citing Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 
279 (1979)) (commenting that plaintiffs must show “a state of mind akin to malice” in order to prove 
discriminatory intent). 
 239 As Robert Bone put it, one reason that discrimination cases suffer under Iqbal is that “mental states 
are notoriously hard to prove.”  Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment 
on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 877 (2010). 
 240 St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 534 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that in 
cases where the plaintiffs lacks “the good luck to have direct evidence of discriminatory intent” 
there lies “the practical question of how the plaintiff without such direct evidence can meet” their 
burden of proof). 
 241 See Leading Cases, supra note 39, at 262. 
 242 See Oppenheimer, supra note 219, at 916 (“If whites are frequently unaware of their own racism, a 
theory of employment discrimination that focuses on an intent to discriminate provides no remedy 
for most discrimination.”); Freeman, supra note 20, at 1054–55 (arguing that the focus on identifying 
a discrete perpetrator harboring discriminatory animus is predicated on a need to declare most 
actors “innocent[]” and thus not liable for bearing the burden of rectifying allegedly discriminatory 
conduct). 
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defended when challenged.243  That commitment (to defend the theory 
against challengers) would preclude this type of dismissal of discrimination 
claims because the subject would have to recognize the possibility that the 
claim is being made on an alternative set of assumptions.  The ensuing 
conversation would interrogate the competing assumptions—and it may, 
ultimately, affirm the superiority of the intentionalist model.244  But opening 
the theory up to such challenge would deprive it of much dissonance-
reduction utility.  And the fact that those who believe in an intentionalist 
theory of discrimination rarely, in practice, seem willing to subject it to this 
sort of meta-debate suggests that it is the theory’s ability to suppress debate, 
rather than any substantive theoretical coherency, that provides the root of 
its appeal. 
V. BYPASSING DISMISSAL: LAW AS A COGNITIVE EXPRESSWAY 
Law is but one of many channels through which a given social 
controversy might be argued.245  While the preceding analysis has certainly 
engaged in specifically legal questions, it has also cast its net more widely to 
consider other vectors of social discourse where dismissal circumvents or 
obstructs important public debates.  But law is not just another forum for 
civil discourse.  It has certain specific characteristics which suggest it occupies 
a crucial niche in the deliberative ecosystem.  This final Part accordingly 
offers a comparative institutionalist account of how dismissal operates in legal 
versus non-legal arenas.  Certain features of the legal system make it uniquely 
well-positioned to overcome the problem of dismissal—at least some of the 
time—and push important public conversations forward. 
This may seem counterintuitive.  In many circumstances, after all, legal 
institutions seem to amplify the problems of dismissal.  Whereas in private 
 
 243 See MICHAEL WILLIAMS, PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO 
EPISTEMOLOGY 25 (2001) (discussing Robert Brandom’s theory of “default” entitlements which 
form the basis for epistemic justification, but which we adopt with the proviso that they will be 
defended if challenged) (internal quotation marks omitted); Kristina Rolin, The Bias Paradox in 
Feminist Standpoint Epistemology, 3  EPISTEME 125, 129 (2006) (“[D]efault assumptions are adopted 
with a commitment to defend them when they are challenged with contrary evidence or other 
arguments.”). 
 244 See Ben Kotzee, Poisoning the Well and Epistemic Privilege, 24 ARGUMENTATION 265, 276–79 (2010) 
(arguing that a claim of epistemic privilege is not inherently invalid so long as the claimant admits 
the legitimacy of, and is willing to partake in, a meta-debate regarding the validity of that claim). 
 245 See generally Catherine R. Albiston, Lauren B. Edelman & Joy Milligan, The Dispute Tree and the Legal 
Forest, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 105, 106–09 (2014) (noting that dispute resolution is not a 
pyramid where initial claims are progressively winnowed down until a rump remainder receive 
legal adjudication, but rather a tree whereby different disputes take different paths towards 
resolution). 
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conversation we are free to explore any thoughts or claims which catch our 
fancy, legal concepts must be sufficiently clear such that citizens have 
considerable advance warning regarding what sorts of behaviors are 
permissible or not, and must have a broad enough base of popular support 
to be enacted into positive law.  Consequently, law by necessity will often 
exclude many types of claims which do not fit inside preexisting doctrinal 
boxes.  This is what Robert Cover famously referred to as law’s “jurispathic” 
quality.246  Law can only accommodate a small sliver of the potential 
understandings which might animate a given conception of rights, justice, or 
the good.  Bound by the need for order and predictability, it must “kill” other 
potential sources of legal understanding.247  The (civil procedure) tool of 
dismissal in many ways operates to screen out those claims which—whatever 
their merits as an abstract notion of justice—do not fall inside the relatively 
narrow borders of accepted legal doctrine. 
Yet there is a less-remarked-upon, but equally important, advantage that 
law provides.  Law offers a unique opportunity to circumvent the problem of 
dismissal because—for those claims which do fit inside the proper 
templates—courts must generally hear the cases presented to them.  While 
pundits, politicians, or everyday people are free to consider any claims they 
like, they are rarely obligated to do so.  The unabridged freedom of the 
private sphere which allows any claim to be heard also allows any claim to 
be ignored.  If a person responds to an uncomfortable assertion by dismissing 
it out of hand, there is rarely anything their interlocutor can do to force the 
issue. 
What law provides against dismissal is a demarcated path through which 
certain claims, framed within preset and (relatively) stable borders, are 
entitled to be heard.  When Robert Bolt described law as “a causeway upon 
which, so long as he keeps to it, a citizen may walk safely,”248 this is not what 
he meant—but the metaphor resonates.  Law may not recognize certain 
forms of discrimination and people may find discrimination claims distasteful 
generally, but an employment discrimination claim that dutifully follows the 
borders of McDonnell-Douglas will at the very least make it to summary 
judgment.249  As a consequence, law can offer an expressway past the first 
 
 246 Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 40 (1983). 
 247 Id. at 53. 
 248 Robert Bolt, A Man For All Seasons 92 (Heinemann ed., 1960). 
 249 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973) (articulating the “prima facie 
case” that must be made demonstrating employment discrimination, with the employer then 
obliged “to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for its decision and the plaintiff 
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two cognitive checkpoints.  Unlike everyday conversation, a legal claim that 
adheres to certain preset conventions generally has to be heard—a court cannot 
shunt it aside simply because it is inconvenient or uncomfortable. 
The ability to even present an issue as one worthy of debate matters.250  
And just as the inability to articulate a given claim in legal language can 
render it infirm even outside the courtroom, the fact that a claim has legal 
resonance comes with legitimizing force.  When Catherine MacKinnon 
identified the importance of law recognizing the concept of sexual 
harassment, she did not focus on the tangible remedies that might result from 
a winning suit.  What was more important was that women “have been given 
a forum, legitimacy to speak, authority to make claims”—only after this 
litany did she conclude with “and an avenue for possible relief.”251  An 
important element of oppression is often its denial that the disenfranchised 
group even has the right to present claims.252  A judicial forum can be a rare 
arena where those claims must be given at least the trappings of reasoned 
analysis. 
Arguments favoring an enhanced judicial role in the protection of 
minority groups typically focus on how judges are relatively insulated from 
popular pressure and prejudices which promote discriminatory legislation.253  
This position immediately runs into trouble, as it is by no means clear that 
 
then required to point to evidence challenging that rationale as a pretext for discrimination).  But 
see Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 
RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 709 (2007) (citation omitted) (suggesting that judicial “dislike of or 
discomfort with certain claims—whether employment discrimination, sexual harassment, or Family 
Medical Leave Act cases,” has prompted judges to be disproportionately willing to dispense of such 
cases at the summary judgment stage). 
 250 See IRIS MARION YOUNG, Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy, in INTERSECTING 
VOICES: DILEMMAS OF GENDER, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, AND POLICY 60, 71 (1997) (“In a 
discussion situation in which different people with different aims, values, and interests seek to solve 
collective problems justly, it is not enough to make assertions and give reasons.  One must also be 
heard.”); ROBERT DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 109 (1989) (arguing that the principle of 
effective democratic participation includes giving each citizen “adequate and equal opportunities 
for placing questions on the agenda and for expressing reasons for endorsing one outcome rather 
than another”). 
 251 CATHERINE MACKINNON, Sexual Harassment: Its First Decade in Court, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: 
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 104 (1987) (emphasis added). 
 252 Cf. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 405 (1857) (concluding that descendants of enslaved 
Africans, even if they are acknowledged as citizens of a state, nonetheless would not be citizens of 
the United States and therefore would not be “entitled to sue as such in one of its courts”); HANNAH 
ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 296 (1994) (“The fundamental deprivation of 
human rights is manifested first and above all in the deprivation of a place in the world which makes 
opinions significant and actions effective.”). 
 253 See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (promoting heightened 
judicial scrutiny in circumstances where laws target “discrete and insular minorities” burdened by 
prejudice in the political system). 
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courts are systematically more likely to be sympathetic to the interests of 
dispossessed groups than are the democratic branches.254  There is, after all, 
something a bit odd about responding to the problem of minority 
dispossession by delegating the issue to a body that is whiter, maler, 
straighter, richer, and older than the American electorate writ large.  
Moreover, there is a more general paradox identified above: if judges are 
unlikely to differ significantly from popular conceptions of key political issues, 
how can they possess any significant advantage as reformers vis-à-vis 
democratic or social actors? 
The focus on dismissal identifies a specific institutional advantage of 
judges that cuts through this Gordian Knot.255  It is plausible—indeed it 
seems likely—that two otherwise similarly situated deliberators will reach 
differing conclusions over a contentious issue if one is forced to provide 
reasons for their position and another is not.  Judges do not necessarily reason 
differently than everyday people, but they are forced to reason more often, 
particularly in politically or emotionally fraught situations.  Judges may be 
most likely to give due accord to marginalized voices, not because they are 
especially moral, wise, or insulated from democratic pressures, but simply 
because the norms of their position often force them to engage in an 
argument where others do not have to. 
Consider the rapid evolution of Americans’ views on same-sex 
marriage.256  For many years, the prospect of gay marriage could be 
dismissed as radical, extreme, a non-starter, ludicrous—all responses that do 
not require any serious engagement of the issue on its merits.  But courts are 
limited in their ability to resort to those sorts of responses.  Nominally, a court 
cannot dismiss a complaint on the grounds that it is “a non-starter.”  They 
need to provide logically and legally cognizable reasons.  Now to be sure, the 
 
 254 See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1404–05 (2006) 
(noting how the “argument for judicial review depends on a particular assumption about the 
distribution of support for the minority’s rights.  The sympathy is assumed to be strongest among 
political elites.”); Christine Bateup, The Dialogic Promise: Assessing the Normative Potential of Theories of 
Constitutional Dialogue, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1109, 1148–49 (2006) (criticizing as “empirically 
questionable” the notion that “judges remain better suited to decide matters of principle due to 
their comparative institutional competences” supposedly stemming from their “political 
insulation”); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 777, 783 (2001) (“Inasmuch as judging is choice, the conclusions drawn from 
psychological research on human judgment and choice likely apply to judges as well.” (internal 
quotations and citations omitted)). 
 255 See supra Part I.A. 
 256 See Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage, PEW RES. CTR. (May 14, 2019), http://www.pewforum.org/
fact-sheet/changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage/ (documenting a thirty-point swing in favor of gay 
marriage between 2004 and 2019). 
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evaluative aspect of motivated cognition gives judges plenty of opportunities 
to turn aside novel or unpopular claims even while purporting to deal with 
them on their merits.257  And losing “on the merits” can come with significant 
dignitary harms too, particularly where the proffered reasons are themselves 
biased or demeaning towards the claimant.258  Getting past the first two 
cognitive checkpoints clearly is not everything.  But it is not nothing either.  
Being in the realm where one’s opponents have to provide reasons against 
your claim is, for many groups, a significant and meaningful advance. 
And just as a dismissed or avoided claim can leaded to a “spiral of silence” 
further marginalizing its proponents,259 where law successfully places an issue 
on social radar screens it can have a cascading effect on public attitudes.  
Once gay marriage broke through with legal victories260 it became 
correspondingly more difficult in public discussion to simply dismiss the 
concept outright.  The early judicial decisions affirming gay marriage did not 
end the debate, but they did signal that a debate must be had.261  And being 
in the realm of substantive debate is a much better place for gay marriage 
advocates to be than they were when the issue could be tossed aside as one 
of fringe radicals.  Meanwhile, as people start to rethink the issue (or really, 
think critically about it for the first time), they can reason from and rely on 
the signals provided by the instigating legal decisions.262 
 
 257 Not to mention the obvious point that, sometimes, marginalized groups nonetheless simply are 
wrong on the merits of their claims.  See Waldron, supra note 254, at 1398 (“People—including 
members of topical minorities—do not necessarily have the rights they think they have.  They may 
be wrong about the rights they have; the majority may be right.”). 
 258 See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN 
LAW 92–93 (1990) (describing the negative effects of bringing a discrimination claim that “define 
some people as different, and inferior, in light of the norm” (citation omitted)). 
 259 See Noelle-Neumann, supra note 76; see also supra notes 119–121 and accompanying text. 
 260 See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993) (holding a law that prohibited same-sex 
marriage per se unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the Hawaii Constitution); 
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) (“We declare that barring 
an individual from the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely because that 
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 261 See, e.g., Jane S. Schacter, Sexual Orientation, Social Change, and the Courts, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 861, 871 
(2006) (“[I]t may one day be said that Baehr and Goodridge started a process that culminated in same-
sex couples securing widespread relationship protections, whether through marriage or civil 
union.”). 
 262 See David Schraub, The Perils and Promise of the Holder Memo, 2012 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 187, 
201 (2012) (“[H]igh-profile legal discussions, particularly when instigated by known political actors 
who can serve as effective opinion leaders, become part of the larger cocktail of considerations 
voters use to assess a given social question.”). 
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Even claims which lose in the courts can have a salutary effect in 
promoting important social conversations.263  Sometimes legal decisions 
spark public conversations leading to formal amendments to the relevant 
legal regimes.  The Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire, 
limiting the timeframe for workers to bring suit over discriminatory pay, was 
met with great public outrage and a swift statutory reversal.264  But even 
where it results in no legal modifications, a losing claim can nonetheless have 
important social ramifications.  When the Iowa Supreme Court held in 2013 
that a male employer’s decision to fire a female subordinate for being too 
sexually attractive was not illegal sex discrimination,265 much of the public 
outrage did not take the form of technical quibbles with the Court’s legal 
analysis but rather with the harmful nature of such a rule as a broader moral 
principle.266  The writers of these critiques seemed to view the decision of the 
court as the definitive, socially sanctioned answer to the question “is firing a 
woman because she is supposedly too ‘desirable’ to her male supervisor 
justifiable as a matter of gender equality,” and if they were right then the 
 
 263 See NeJaime, supra note 17, at 954 (citations omitted) (noting that, even among scholars who believe 
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 264 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 628–29 (2007) (requiring that a plaintiff 
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 265 Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, 834 N.W.2d 64 (Iowa 2013) (holding that terminating a female 
employee because of her appearance, while unfair, does not amount to illegal gender 
discrimination). 
 266 See, e.g., Jessica Valenti, Asking for It, NATION (Jan. 11, 2013), http://www.thenation.com/asking-it 
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  Of course, this is not to say that there is not space to argue that the decision was legally wrong, or 
that the decision was legally correct and that the law should be changed.  But the point is that the 
decision was taken by many to entail not just the court’s legal judgment on the meaning of the 
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was taken to be normatively dangerous.  But see Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 73 (stating that the relevant 
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whether the alleged facts constituted unlawful discrimination). 
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decision is depressing indeed.267  But the public reaction to the decision—
largely critical and incredulous—is at least as important as the formal legal 
outcome.  The legal proceedings placed this sort of behavior in public 
conversation, and the general consensus that emerged seemed to be that such 
an action is wrong.  Identifying and articulating that consensus has value 
regardless of the formal legal disposition of the case.  Thirty, forty, fifty years 
ago, it is unlikely that behavior like this would have ever even made it onto 
the social radar screen.  Courts provided a vector for that social conversation 
to happen, and the results outside the courtroom were overwhelmingly 
positive. 
CONCLUSION 
Everyone comes to the table with certain value commitments; everyone 
comes to the table seeking to suppress certain thoughts they would rather not 
think.  In its most explored facet, motivated cognition deals with a very 
specific instantiation of this instinct: biased appraisals of received evidence.  
But often times, this is not the most common or most effective defensive 
strategy.  We can construct our social world to avoid hearing certain types of 
claims.  And, more dangerously, we can create conditions where we feel 
justified in dismissing certain claims—refusing to even consider them 
substantively on their merits.  When abused, dismissal breaches our duty to 
listen to our fellows and does not respect members of marginalized 
communities as epistemic agents. 
As institutions, law and the courts sit in an interesting position vis-à-vis 
dismissal.  On the one hand, law is limited in its ability to address novel claims 
because law is by design a limited instrument.  A significant purpose of law 
is precisely to winnow down the theoretically infinite array of claims a litigant 
might make into a much narrower and more manageable set that are known 
in advance.  Yet within those boundaries, law also offers significant 
opportunities.  If a claim can be framed within the four corners of a 
recognized legal doctrine, courts are uniquely situated in public dialogue 
because they cannot simply refuse to listen.  They cannot “dismiss” a claim 
simply because it is discomfiting or disconcerting, politically unpopular or a 
“non-starter.”  They have to give reasons.  And while that is not the end of 
the game, it is for many groups and many claims the beginning of broader 
 
 267 See, e.g., Valenti, supra note 266; Joseph Diebold, Iowa Supreme Court: It’s Okay To Fire A Woman For 
Being Too Attractive, THINKPROGRESS (July 12, 2013), https://thinkprogress.org/iowa-supreme-
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social conversation that otherwise might have been avoided or dismissed 
outright.  
The linkage between legal and discursive dismissal is more than just a 
comparative exercise, however.  Legal scholarship frequently asks what other 
disciplines—economics, psychology, philosophy—have to teach us about 
law.  This Article suggests that law has something to teach us about the ethics 
of our everyday discursive interactions.  Deeply embedded in legal culture 
are a series of important deliberative norms that make fair argument and 
adjudication possible.  These include the right of all sides to present 
arguments, the importance of fairly weighing evidence, and the obligation to 
take seriously even uncomfortable claims.  In a political climate where many 
Americans worry that we are becoming epistemically siloed—stuck in like-
minded bubbles, unwilling or unable to even contemplate arguments from 
communities foreign to our own—these virtues often feel in short supply.  
The focus on dismissal—the legal concept analyzed as a discursive practice—
can help point the way to more expansive and more just modes of interacting 
across political and cultural difference.  In this way, legal thinking is valuable 
not simply as a means of securing formal rights and remedies at the end of a 
filed case.  The lessons of the law can also inform our everyday deliberative 
practices, pushing us to be less close-minded, less arrogant, less partisan—
less dismissive—towards the ordinary hard thoughts that a functioning 
democratic citizen must force herself to think.  
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